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THE MEANING OF JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY: AN EXAMINATION OF
SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION DEBATES AND SUPREME COURT
RULINGS ON RACIAL EQUALITY
Stuart Chinn*
Abstract
Three years into the Trump presidency and especially in the
aftermath of Justice Kavanaugh’s elevation to the Supreme Court, the
ideal of judicial impartiality is once again central in our public discourse.
Because we have, in turn, a president especially skeptical of the judiciary’s
separation from partisanship, heightened political polarization, and
heightened stakes around judicial rulings in this age of gridlocked
governance, the question of how judges approach their work has assumed
a significance that goes beyond concern over the outcomes they will reach.
However, as important as the concept of judicial impartiality may be,
it is worth pausing to examine what speakers generally mean when they
mention the term. In this Article, I argue that at its core, the invocation of
“judicial impartiality” in political discourse speaks to an ideal of fairness:
an impartial judge is a person who acts fairly toward all parties in a case
appearing before them. My focus in this article is on examining the
concept of judicial impartiality in this familiar sense, with the hope of
providing some insight into the underlying norms that structure our public
discourse around judicial appointments, judicial rulings, and responses
by elected officials to judicial rulings.
This Article seeks to advance three claims. First, I claim that the
divergent Democratic and Republican views on judicial impartiality—as
illustrated in the context of the Supreme Court confirmation hearings and
debates for Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Sonia Sotomayor—are
rooted in each party’s distinct electoral coalitions and ideological
histories. Secondly, I claim that notwithstanding these divergences, both
Democratic and Republican-appointed justices on the Supreme Court
share a common institutional environment at present of judicial
uncertainty. This shared institutional condition, I argue, alters how
Democratic and Republican-appointed justices are able to implement
their respective visions of judicial impartiality in actual adjudication. On
this point, I discuss some of the Roberts Court’s recent rulings on race and
equal protection to help anchor the examination of judicial impartiality in
constitutional doctrine. Finally, in the final portion of the Article, my
argument takes a normative turn in making my third claim: accepting that
*
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some degree of partiality is inevitable in the judicial role, judicial
impartiality is best understood as denoting a consistent, good-faith
engagement with the claims and interests of those who lie outside the
social groups that are aligned with a judicial actor. I conclude the Article
with a few words on what this conception of judicial impartiality might
imply, or even demand, of Democratic and Republican-appointed judicial
actors seeking to uphold the ideal of judicial impartiality in the present
time.
In response to then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s testimony in front of the Senate
Judiciary Committee on an allegation of sexual assault, more than 2400 law
professors signed a public letter opposing his nomination to the Supreme Court. The
letter stated in part:
Even in his prepared remarks, Judge Kavanaugh described the hearing as
partisan, referring to it as “a calculated and orchestrated political hit,”
rather than acknowledging the need for the Senate, faced with new
information, to try to understand what had transpired. Instead of trying to
sort out with reason and care the allegations that were raised, Judge
Kavanaugh responded in an intemperate, inflammatory and partial
manner, as he interrupted and, at times, was discourteous to senators.
...
We have differing views about the other qualifications of Judge
Kavanaugh. But we are united, as professors of law and scholars of judicial
institutions, in believing that he did not display the impartiality and
judicial temperament requisite to sit on the highest court of our land.1
The following month, in response to a ruling by Judge Jon Tigar of the U.S. District
Court on asylum claims, President Trump remarked that the ruling was “not law,”
“a disgrace,” that in “[e]very case that gets filed in the Ninth Circuit we get beaten,”
and that Judge Tigar “was an Obama judge.”2 These comments set off a noteworthy
exchange with Chief Justice John Roberts, who in turn stated: “We do not have
Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges.”3 Rather, Roberts
maintained that “[w]hat we have is an extraordinary group of dedicated judges doing
their level best to do equal right to those appearing before them. That independent
1

Opinion, The Senate Should Not Confirm Kavanaugh, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://nyti.ms/2OBGfjC [https://perma.cc/YK2K-NWJ8]. I should note that I was a signer
of this letter.
2
Adam Liptak, Trump Takes Aim at Appeals Court, Calling It a Disgrace, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 21 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/20/us/politics/trump-appeals-courtninth-circuit.html [https://perma.cc/F9RE-23GW].
3
Id.
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judiciary is something we should all be thankful for.”4 In response, Trump
commented in a tweet: “Sorry Chief Justice John Roberts, but you do indeed have
‘Obama judges,’ and they have a much different point of view than the people who
are charged with the safety of our country.”5
We are thus at a moment where judicial impartiality is once again central in
public discussion. Because we have, in turn, a president especially skeptical of the
judiciary’s separation from partisanship,6 heightened political polarization, and
heightened stakes around judicial rulings in this age of gridlocked governance, the
question of how judges approach their work has assumed a significance that goes
beyond concern over the outcomes they will reach.7
However, as important as the concept of judicial impartiality may be, it is worth
pausing to examine what speakers generally mean when they mention the term.8
This seems a timely question, if only because there are a number of reasons to be
concerned about the dynamics of federal judicial appointments for the remainder of
the Trump presidency and beyond. Public and scholarly anxieties about federal
judicial appointments—particularly Supreme Court appointments—are hardly new.9
Extreme partisanship and the breakdown of senatorial norms surrounding Supreme

4

Id.
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 21, 2018 12:51 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1065346909362143232 [https://perma.cc/7Y6T
-E2CP].
6
In a similar vein, then-candidate Trump had also raised a racially-charged claim that
U.S. District Court Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel, who was overseeing a class-action lawsuit
against Trump University, was biased against him because Judge Curiel was of Mexican
heritage. See The Editorial Board, Donald Trump and the Judge, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/01/opinion/donald-trump-and-the-judge.html?module=
inline [https://perma.cc/R8M5-BBE8]; Liptak, supra note 2.
7
See infra Part III on contemporary political polarization.
8
Charles Geyh very helpfully disaggregates the concept of judicial impartiality along
three distinct dimensions—a procedural dimension, a political dimension, and an ethical
dimension—though he also acknowledges the possibility or even the likelihood of overlap
across them on certain issues. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial
Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 493, 493, 511–14 (2014). I believe my discussion of judicial
impartiality implicates all three dimensions he identifies. Beyond that, my core concerns in
this article are primarily within the area that Geyh labels the political dimension, and
secondarily within the procedural dimension. Thus, as the following paragraphs will clarify,
my examination of judicial impartiality is much less expansive than his, and focused on
particular components of this ideal.
9
See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919,
935–42 (1995) (urging greater exploration of a judicial nominee’s substantive views in the
Senate’s confirmation hearings and debates); Geoffrey R. Stone, Understanding Supreme
Court Confirmations, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 381, 442–54 (2010) (attributing the increasing
divisiveness of the Supreme Court confirmation process after 2000 to a broader public
perception about the politicization of the Court).
5
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Court nominations has long been a point of public discussion.10 Still, there is good
reason to think that the increasing polarization of partisan politics since the start of
the Trump presidency—alongside the heightened frequency of “constitutional
hardball”11 tactics during this time—will only amplify already-significant concerns
around appointments to the federal judiciary, and the inability of judicial actors to
remain impartial.12
The focus of my attention in this Article is on the ideal of judicial impartiality,
particularly as described in Supreme Court confirmation debates and as applied in
the Court’s more recent cases dealing with race under the Equal Protection Clause.13
As is the case with terms like “judicial activism” or “judicial independence,”
“judicial impartiality” is a term that encompasses, and plausibly intersects with, a
wide range of legal and ethical concerns. At its core, however, one might say without
courting too much controversy that “judicial impartiality” speaks in some measure
to a norm of fairness: an impartial judge is a person who acts in a fair or unbiased
10
See, e.g., Grace Sparks, Americans Think the Supreme Court Nomination Process Is
Way Too Partisan, CNN (June 27, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/27/politics/scotuspartisanship-poll/index.html [https://perma.cc/WP29-SLVJ]; Livia Gershon, How Supreme
Court Nominations Became Political Battles, JSTOR DAILY (Feb. 18, 2016),
https://daily.jstor.org/how-supreme-court-nominations-became-political-battles/ [https://
perma.cc/7S8A-WERL].
11
As Mark Tushnet defines the term, constitutional hardball:

consists of political claims and practices—legislative and executive initiatives—
that are without much question within the bounds of existing constitutional
doctrine and practice but that are nonetheless in some tension with existing preconstitutional understandings. . . . [I]ts practitioners see themselves as playing for
keeps in a special kind of way . . .
Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL. L. REV. 523, 523 (2004).
12
Dan Kahan stated the following in 2011:
[T]here is something different now: a widespread sense of futility, and even
cynicism. We take for granted that “shaping the Court” is part and parcel of the
major parties’ political agendas — at issue not just in elections of presidents, but
also in the everyday operation of the Senate, which routinely blocks appointment
of lower court nominees whose potential elevation to the Court might decisively
shift its ideological balance. Professions of “impartiality” ritualistically extracted
from Supreme Court nominees in their confirmation hearings are contemptuously
jeered as theater.
Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for
Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (2011). See also id. at 4–6.
13
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which . . . [will] deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
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manner toward all parties in a case appearing before them.14 As such, I proceed from
the view in this Article that common invocations of the ideal of “judicial
impartiality” really speak to an ideal of “judicial fairness,” or one’s confidence that
a judge will treat the litigants and issues in front of her with fairness. My focus in
this Article is on examining the concept of judicial impartiality in this familiar sense.
Furthermore, my goal is to examine this issue by trying to gain some understanding
of how Supreme Court nominees/justices and Senators have themselves addressed
this issue in confirmation hearings, confirmation debates, and in a focused set of
judicial opinions. In a general sense, I hope that by illuminating the contours of
judicial impartiality in the present time, we might gain some understanding of the
status of this concept within our broader legal and political culture. This, in turn,
might give us some insight into the nature of judicial legitimacy within the
contemporary context.
Hence my goals here are in good measure descriptive and explanatory; I intend
to explicate some dimensions of judicial impartiality as that ideal and concept is
presently understood.15 However, there is a normative component to my argument
as well. As I will discuss below, I do believe that within present debates, there are
areas of potential convergence as to what judicial impartiality entails. Highlighting
and elaborating on those points of convergence may, in turn, provide some useful
guidelines for those political and judicial actors who feel compelled to uphold and
further the ideal of judicial impartiality.
In the pages below, I proceed with a more focused look at these issues by
concentrating on two sets of items meant to provide a preliminary exploration of
these themes in the contemporary context. First, in Part I, I proceed by initially
fleshing out some preliminary concepts tied to judicial impartiality as they have been
discussed in the legal literature. As this Part will clarify, my focus on judicial
impartiality is limited to one specific, though still significant, component of that
ideal: the degree to which judicial actors should feel bound to engage in general
applications of the law versus more context-sensitive applications of the law. Stated
otherwise, should an impartial judge take into account social facts about the litigants
before her or not?
With this conceptual background in place, I move on in Part II to examine the
confirmation hearings and debates for Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Sonia
Sotomayor. This Part provides much of the basis for the descriptive claims in this
paper, as the entryway into understanding how the concept of judicial impartiality is
commonly deployed in public discourse. My choice to focus on Chief Justice
14

See The Senate Should Not Confirm Kavanaugh, supra note 1.
In his insightful article, “Legitimacy and the Constitution,” Richard Fallon
disaggregates constitutional legitimacy into three types of legitimacy: legal, sociological, and
moral. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787,
1790 (2005). Fallon’s discussion of sociological legitimacy builds upon the influential work
of H.L.A. Hart and aligns with my focus upon the popular acceptance of legal norms and
principles. Id. at 1790–92, 1805–06, 1825, 1848.
15

920

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

Roberts stems in part from his place in the Court’s history as the first Supreme Court
nominee since Justice Breyer’s nomination more than a decade earlier, his arrival
marked the start of the “Roberts Court” in 2005.16 Beyond this, Chief Justice
Roberts’ hearings were also notable for his famous comparison of judges to
umpires—a catch-phrase or slogan that was widely-repeated in the aftermath of his
elevation to the Court.17 Similar reasons account for my focus on Justice
Sotomayor’s confirmation hearings and debates. Aside from the appeal of her
providing some partisan balance as a Democratic nominee alongside the
Republican-nominated Chief Justice Roberts, judicial impartiality was also frontand-center in her nomination due to her references to race, bias, and the perspective
of a “wise Latina” in a prior speech that became a focal point of Senate questioning
and discussion.18 What emerges from this discussion in Part II is an apparent
divergence between Democrats and Republicans: while Democrats tended to believe
that judicial impartiality demands the judicial recognition of certain social facts
about the parties involved in a case, Republicans consistently endorsed a view of
judicial impartiality as demanding a more universal, general application of the law.
With this foundation in place for understanding judicial impartiality both
conceptually and within political discourse, I move on in Part III to examine
divergent Democratic and Republican views of judicial impartiality. In this Part, I
elaborate on two of the three main claims of this paper: first, I claim that the
divergent Democratic and Republican views on judicial impartiality, as illustrated
in Part II, are rooted in their distinct electoral coalitions and ideological histories.
However, I also make a second claim that, notwithstanding these divergences, both
Democratic and Republican justices on the Supreme Court share a common
institutional environment at present of judicial uncertainty. This shared condition, I
argue, ultimately alters how Democratic and Republican-appointed justices can
implement their respective visions of judicial impartiality in actual adjudication.
Part IV provides some tentative support for the preceding point, where I discuss
some of the Roberts Court’s recent rulings on race and equal protection, to help
anchor this examination of judicial impartiality in an especially relevant body of
constitutional doctrine. I offer a selective examination of some of the highest-profile
race and equal protection cases decided by the Roberts Court thus far: Parents
16

Maura Reynolds, Roberts Is Sworn in as Chief Justice, L.A. TIMES (Sep. 30, 2005),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2005-sep-30-na-roberts30-story.html [https://
perma.cc/J75A-ABE9] (acknowledging that Roberts was “the first new appointee to the
court in more than a decade”). See Ballotpedia, History of the Supreme Court, BALLOTPEDIA,
(last visited June 30, 2019), https://ballotpedia.org/History_of_the_Supreme_Court
[https://perma.cc/WQZ7-6FYV] (listing the “Roberts Court” as the current among other eras
of the Supreme Court).
17
Indeed, it was a point of discussion in Sonia Sotomayor’s confirmation hearings and
debates four years later. See infra Section II.B. Mark Tushnet notes that the umpire metaphor
has since been a cause for mild regret from Roberts in subsequent years. MARK TUSHNET, IN
THE BALANCE: LAW AND POLITICS ON THE ROBERTS COURT 72 (2013).
18
See infra Part II.B.
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Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,19 Fisher v.
University of Texas (Fisher I),20 and Fisher v. University of Texas (Fisher II)21 and
Schuette v. BAMN.22 This discussion will demonstrate how, within the context of
actual adjudication, the present political context inescapably alters how partisan
ideals of judicial impartiality are applied by sitting Supreme Court justices.
Finally, in Part V, my argument takes a normative turn. In that Part, I set forth
my third and final claim: accepting that some degree of partiality is realistically
inevitable in the judicial role, judicial impartiality is best understood as denoting a
consistent, good-faith engagement with the claims and interests of those who lie
outside the social groups that are aligned with a judicial actor.23 I conclude the
Article with a few words on what this conception of judicial impartiality might
imply, or even demand, of Democratic and Republican-appointed judicial actors
seeking to uphold the ideal of judicial impartiality in the present context.
I. GENERALITY AND PARTIALITY
As noted in the preceding section, my focus on judicial impartiality centers on
a more specific question in relation to that concept: namely, whether judicial
impartiality or judicial fairness demands attentiveness or ignorance of social facts
about the parties in a given case. Before delving into the nuances and complexities
of thoughtful answers to this question in the context of actual adjudication, we might
first probe this issue in more abstract, conceptual terms by thinking about two more
principled answers.
One answer is that judicial impartiality demands no recognition of any social
facts about the parties appearing before a judge.24 This perspective would equate
judicial impartiality with a demand for generality in the application of the law.
Another answer might emphasize the necessity of judges taking such social facts
into account.25 This perspective would thus suggest that judicial impartiality,
properly understood, demands at least some degree of partiality or differential
treatment of individuals under the law. Hence, at first glance, a conceptual fuzziness
may emerge when individuals invoke “partiality” as necessary to judicial impartiality. However, this oddity may easily be explained once we recognize that
speakers often have “judicial fairness” in mind when they invoke “judicial

19

551 U.S. 701 (2007).
133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013).
21
136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
22
134 S.Ct. 1623 (2014).
23
Aligning with this point, Geyh notes that “[i]f perfect impartiality is unattainable, the
more pragmatic objective is to ensure that judges are ‘impartial enough’ to fulfill the role
assigned them under state and federal constitutions: to uphold the rule of law.” Geyh, supra
note 8, at 497.
24
See infra notes 29–33 and accompanying text.
25
See infra notes 34–42 and accompanying text.
20
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impartiality.”26 Thus, contrary to the common image, under the latter view Lady
Justice should not be blind, but should instead be sensitive to context, structure, and
relevant social facts.
Each perspective possesses distinct attributes, so let us consider generality first.
Perhaps the core normative appeal of generality in the law lies in the promise of
regularized, equal treatment. General and consistent application of legal principles
by judicial actors ensures that similar cases will be treated alike, and individuals will
be treated fairly and equally regardless of (supposedly) irrelevant characteristics
such as ancestry, wealth, race, gender, sexual orientation, or other markers of social
status.27 The intrinsic appeal of generality is such that it is closely identified among
scholars and non-scholars with other similarly weighty normative commitments
such as the rule-of-law and rule-formalism.28
For example, Lon Fuller famously identified eight elements required for a
system of law to exist, and the first was a requirement of generality in legal rules.
Generality ensures that a legal basis for a decision or action in a given case
necessarily has applicability beyond the case in question to other similar cases.29 A
similar orientation is apparent in Herbert Wechsler’s likewise-famous call for
“neutral principles” to guide Supreme Court decision-making—a point he made in
relation to his critique of the Brown v. Board of Education30 ruling. As Wechsler
stated,
I put it to you that the main constituent of the judicial process is precisely
that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that
is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite
transcending the immediate result that is achieved. To be sure, the courts
decide, or should decide, only the case they have before them. But must
they not decide on grounds of adequate neutrality and generality, tested
not only by the instant application but by others that the principles imply?
Is it not the very essence of judicial method to insist upon attending to such
other cases, preferably those involving an opposing interest, in evaluating
any principle avowed?31

26

For an example of this, see infra note 75 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
See infra notes 29–33 and accompanying text.
28
Id.
29
LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38–39, 46–49, 110, 210 (Rev. Ed. 1969).
Interestingly, Fuller’s requirement of generality via legal rules was focused more on the
notion of equal treatment across similar cases, and less on the related, but as he saw it, distinct
problem of legal rules that targeted specific individuals or classes of individuals. Id. at 47–
48.
30
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 15 (1959).
27
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Numerous scholars since Fuller have emphasized the equality benefits inherent in
the judicial utilization of categorical rules, as opposed to more flexible standards, in
deciding legal cases.32 Cass Sunstein, for example, makes these points simply:
Rules are associated with impartiality. Their impartiality is captured in the
notion that the Goddess justice is blindfolded. Rules are blind to many
features of a case that might otherwise be relevant and that are relevant in
some social contexts—religion, social class, good looks, height, and so
forth—and also to many things on whose relevance people have great
difficulty agreeing. . . . A comparative disadvantage of rule-free decisions
is that they increase the risk that illegitimate considerations will influence
decisions. . . . With rules, people who are similarly situated are more likely
to be similarly treated.33
Notwithstanding these well-known virtues of generality in the law, it also
possesses some well-known potential drawbacks. These items of concern, in turn,
speak to the virtues of partiality in the orientation and application of the law. For
example, consider the goals of equality and equal treatment again. If it is easy to see
how these purposes might be effectuated with general rules and blind application of
the law, it is also not hard to see how these goals might be subverted by them as
well. A general legal rule or a mechanical administration of the law might, for
example, undermine equality goals by failing to take into account compelling moral
or sociological differences between cases or individuals—thus leading to
superficially equal outcomes that mask dramatic inequities.34
To take a familiar example from equal protection doctrine, one might consider
the case of affirmative action policies in higher education admissions. Such policies’
prolonged existence in American society signals, at the least, a degree of discomfort
among higher educational administrators—and, one might presume, American
society more broadly—with basing admissions solely on ostensibly neutral criteria
like standardized test scores or high school GPAs. A general system of higher
educational admissions based solely on these numerical indicators would seemingly
be impartial and ensure superficially equal treatment for all. Because of
socioeconomic advantages and disadvantages that accrue to different segments of

32

See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 104–05,
112–13 (1996); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8–9, 14–18 (1997) [hereinafter Fallon, “Rule of Law”];
Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 785–86, 791–92
(1989); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178
(1989); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 506, 540, 543 (1988); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 62 (1992).
33
SUNSTEIN, supra note 32, at 104–05, 112–13.
34
Id. at 113, 117–18, 132; Schauer, supra note 32, at 540, 543–44; Sullivan, supra note
32, at 62.
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American youth in elementary and secondary education,35 and because standardized
test scores might reflect such disadvantages and benefits, such a system of
admissions would still strike many as inequitable despite this apparent equality of
treatment.36
At least within the context of contemporary constitutional law, probably the
most conspicuous examples of partiality in the law are those instances where judicial
actors evaluate status-based classifications under equal protection-scrutiny analysis
and apply different levels of scrutiny to different types of classifications.37 Within
these rulings, the doctrine applied by judges recognizes and is indeed constituted by,
the presence of certain social characteristics residing within the challenged law or
within the claims of litigants. More generally, partiality in the law often appears
where judicial actors might deploy more flexible (or more judicial-discretionfriendly) standards to allow for the subjects involved, and the specifics of the case
at hand, to influence the legal outcome.38 Thus, to offer one well-known example,
Justice Ginsburg articulated the following doctrinal principle for evaluating genderbased classifications in the case of United States v. Virginia,39 where the Court struck
down the Virginia Military Institute’s exclusion of female students as an
unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clause:
To summarize the Court’s current directions for cases of official
classification based on gender: Focusing on the differential treatment for
denial of opportunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing court must
determine whether the proffered justification is “exceedingly persuasive.”
The burden of justification is demanding[,] and it rests entirely on the
State. The State must show “at least that the [challenged] classification
serves ‘important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory
means employed’ are ‘substantially related to the achievement of those
35
For an insightful and in-depth examination of the various challenges faced in the
public school system of Newark, New Jersey, and the various reform strategies that public
school reformers have recently tried there, see Dale Russakoff, Schooled, THE NEW YORKER
(May 12, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/05/19/schooled [https://perma
.cc/9T8L-TE83].
36
This invokes the familiar image of a “fair” foot-race articulated by Lyndon Johnson:
“You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring
him up to the starting line of a race and then say, ‘you are free to compete with all the others,’
and still justly believe that you have been completely fair.” President Lyndon B. Johnson,
Commencement Address at Howard University: To Fulfill These Rights (June 4, 1965),
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/commencement-address-at-howarduniversity-to-fulfill-these-rights/ [https://perma.cc/73J6-WH34].
37
On the three tiers of scrutiny analysis between rationality review, intermediate
scrutiny, and strict scrutiny, see STUART CHINN, RECALIBRATING REFORM: THE LIMITS OF
POLITICAL CHANGE 272 (2014).
38
Sullivan, supra note 32, at 58–59, 66.
39
518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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objectives.’” The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or
invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must not rely on
overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or
preferences of males and females.40
Finally, even though the previous example of partiality speaks to a modern
sensibility about suspect classes that is familiar in contemporary constitutional law,41
the basic idea of partiality in the law is by no means limited to this context. Indeed,
whether the focus is on legal rules regarding who is eligible to vote in which
elections, or the scope of an individual’s various tax obligations, or legal standards
such as the tiers of scrutiny in equal protection doctrine, partiality is inevitable in
the law—at least in the minimal sense that the law and the judicial application of it
almost always function to treat some individuals differently than others because of
certain social facts.42
Thus, most of us would hardly find it worthy of concern that a state might
restrict automobile drivers to those at or above a certain age limit. Such a law and
the age classification contained within it would reflect a governmental partiality
toward people at or above that age who wish to drive, and a disfavoring of those
below the age limit who wish to drive. Of course, partiality in the sense of an age
restriction on driving is a rather mild case, and it would not run afoul of Fuller’s
requirement that the law must be composed of general rules either: everyone in the
state would be equally subject to such a law.
Still, the example underscores at least one point relevant for subsequent
discussion: the conspicuous presence of generality and partiality themes in commonplace examples like age limits on driving suggests the utility of thinking about these
concepts as situated on a continuum. It should not be surprising that the most
normatively defensible perspectives on judicial impartiality will often be positioned
in the middle, given the normative qualms raised by taking either view to the
extreme. Extreme generality poses the troubling concern about potential blindness
to morally and sociologically-relevant differences among subjects and cases.43 At
40

Id. at 532–33 (citations omitted).
The conventional starting point, doctrinally, for this sensibility is the famous footnote
4 in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (citations omitted)
(“Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes
directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities; whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”).
42
As Tussman and tenBroek put it in their classic article on equal protection: “Here,
then, is a paradox: The equal protection of the laws is a ‘pledge of the protection of equal
laws.’ But laws may classify. And ‘the very idea of classification is that of inequality.’”
Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV.
341, 344 (1949).
43
See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
41
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the same time, excessive partiality at the other end can introduce different concerns
such as the specter of corruption, self-dealing, nepotism, and the absence of any of
the benefits of regularity and generality offered by legal rules.44
II. SENATE DEBATES OVER THE ROBERTS AND SOTOMAYOR SUPREME COURT
NOMINATIONS
With some conceptual preliminaries out of the way, the more central questions
in this Article lie in understanding how generality and partiality themes intersect
with prevailing notions of judicial impartiality. As an initial step in gaining some
insight into this question, I examine the Supreme Court confirmation hearings and
debates for Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Sonia Sotomayor. My general
interest in focusing on Supreme Court nominations is perhaps not hard to intuit:
there are few better contemporary contexts for seeing a public dialogue on legal and
judicial legitimacy than a Supreme Court nomination.45 To the extent we can
reasonably assume legislators will say things that resonate with their voters—if only
at the least, to aid their hopes for reelection46—we can likewise realistically assume
that the ideas and arguments that appear in these nomination efforts are generally
ones that would resonate with at least some substantial portion of American voters.
Likewise, for similar reasons, we might presume that the ideas and arguments that
do not enjoy ready affirmation and endorsement in these dialogues are generally not
ones that enjoy intense support from substantial portions of the electorate.
In the sections that follow, I focus on the arguments about generality and
partiality that appear in these confirmation hearings and debates. My use of two case
studies was to ensure a broader look at the relevant questions and themes while
minimizing the effects of the peculiarities of a single case. Further, a benefit of
pairing one nominee by a Republican president (George W. Bush) and one nominee
44
Hence this phrase by Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison is often taken as a basic
description of the rule of law: “The government of the United States has been emphatically
termed a government of laws, and not of men.” 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). See also Frank
Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1499–1501 (1988) (stating that American
constitutionalism is based on the premise “that the American people are politically free
insomuch as they are governed by laws and not men”); Fallon, “Rule of Law,” supra note
32, at 2–3; Radin, supra note 32, at 781.
45
See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 782 (1983) (noting that the confirmation
process is, like most rituals, “important primarily because it reveals to us some of the deep
assumptions prevalent in the culture.”).
46
See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 11–78 (1974)
(“Congress has declined into a battle for individual survival. Each of the Congressmen and
each of the Senators has the attitude: ‘I’ve got to look out for myself.’ . . . Most of them are
willing only to follow those things that will protect them and give them the coloration which
allows them to blend into their respective districts or their respective states. If you don’t stick
your neck out, you don’t get it chopped off.”) (citation omitted).
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by a Democratic president (Barack Obama) is that it allows for an examination of
each political party’s arguments within two distinct contexts: when each party was
aligned with a nominating president, and when each party was not aligned with the
nominating president.47 In addition, given that the Roberts nomination occurred in
2005 and the Sotomayor nomination occurred in 2009, we have two case-studies
transpiring somewhat close to each other in the recent past, thus ensuring a
reasonably solid, contemporary examination of these themes.
Finally, most importantly, I focused on Roberts and Sotomayor specifically
because the themes of impartiality and partiality were central points of discussion in
both of their confirmation efforts. Roberts’s reference to judges as “umpires,”48 for
example, garnered a great deal of attention during his hearings in front of the Senate
Judiciary Committee and in the broader debate in the Senate.49 Likewise, a focal
point for skeptics of Sotomayor during her hearings were references to identity
politics in a speech she gave at U.C. Berkeley Law School in 2001,50 which
intersected with a statement by then-Senator Obama on the importance of empathy
in Supreme Court nominees during the Roberts confirmation.51
My approach was to review both the Roberts and Sotomayor confirmation
hearings in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the confirmation debates
on both justices in the full Senate, looking for discussion of generality, partiality,
and judicial impartiality by the nominees or the Senators. Since my focus was on
grasping the complexities and subtleties in how these ideals were invoked, I focused
less on exhaustively documenting each reference to these principles, and more on
context-sensitive readings of the most extensive and substantive references to these
themes. As will be clear, certain Senators loom a little larger than others in these
discussions.
A. Defenses, Critiques, and Elaborations on Impartiality
in the Roberts Nomination
Perhaps the least surprising finding from a review of the confirmation hearings
of Justice Roberts is the strong link between judicial impartiality and generality
within the broader discourse. In perhaps the most commonly-referenced line in his
47

The partisan makeup of the Senate for the Roberts Confirmation was 44 Democrats,
55 Republicans, and 1 Independent. The partisan makeup for the Sotomayor nomination was
57 Democrats, 41 Republicans, and 2 Independents. See Party Division, UNITED STATES
SENATE (June 23, 2019), https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm [https://perma.cc/J67
E-FHTH].
48
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice
of the United States, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts’s Confirmation Hearing]
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States).
49
See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 21408 (2005) (statement of Sen. Sessions).
50
These remarks were published in Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87 (2002).
51
151 CONG. REC. 21032 (2005) (statement of Sen. Obama).
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testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Roberts stated this about the
judicial role:
My personal appreciation that I owe a great debt to others reinforces my
view that a certain humility should characterize the judicial role. Judges
and Justices are servants of the law, not the other way around. Judges are
like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. The role of
an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the
rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the
umpire.52
He subsequently stated the following in an exchange with Senator Grassley (R-IA):
Judge ROBERTS. He [Alexander Hamilton] said judges should not have
an absolute discretion; they need to be bound down by rules and
precedents—the rules, the laws that you pass, the precedents that judges
before them have shaped. And then their job is interpreting the law. It is
not making the law. And so long as they are being confined by the laws,
by the Constitution, by the precedents, then you’re more comfortable that
you’re exercising the judicial function. It’s when you’re at sea, and you
don’t have anything to look to that you need to begin to worry that this
isn’t what judges are supposed to do.
Senator GRASSLEY. Well, is there any room in constitutional
interpretation for the judge’s own values or beliefs?
Judge ROBERTS. No, I don’t think there is. Sometimes it’s hard to give
meaning to a constitutional term in a particular case. But you don’t look
to your own values and beliefs. You look outside yourself to other sources.
This is the basis for, you know, that judges wear black robes, because it
doesn’t matter who they are as individuals. That’s not going to shape their
decision. It’s their understanding of the law that will shape their decision.53
We might see within these comments several significant themes. The first is a view
of the law as objectively clear—like the rules of a sporting contest. Second, Roberts
also offered an endorsement of judicial modesty and limiting judicial discretion,
made possible in part by the clarity of the law and legal rules.
Third, there are implications for the treatment of individuals and groups that
also flow from the umpire analogy. Given the modest role for judges that Roberts
expressed, one ready implication is to see judges engaged in ensuring a kind of
52

Roberts’s Confirmation Hearing, supra note 48 (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.,
Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States).
53
Id. at 177–78 (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the
United States and Sen. Charles Grassley, Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary).
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fairness: the equal treatment of all individuals under general rules. In response to a
comment by Senator Durbin (D-IL)—a point that I will return to below—Roberts
stated the following:
[S]omebody asked me, you know, “Are you going to be on the side of the
little guy?” And you obviously want to give an immediate answer, but as
you reflect on it, if the Constitution says that the little guy should win, the
little guy is going to win in court before me. But if the Constitution says
that the big guy should win, well, then, the big guy is going to win, because
my obligation is to the Constitution. That’s the oath. The oath that a judge
takes is not that I will look out for particular interests, I’ll be on the side
of particular interests. The oath is to uphold the Constitution and laws of
the United States, and that’s what I would do.54
All three themes were subsequently emphasized in the debates over the Roberts
nomination within the full Senate. With respect to the umpire analogy, that line was
thoroughly referenced throughout by a number of Senators,55 along with additional
elaboration on the proper modesty that should be attached to the judicial role. For
example, as then-Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL) stated in a straightforward reference
to impartiality and the neutrality of general rules:
I saw Senator BURNS here. He used to be a football referee. I wanted to
ask him: Senator BURNS. if you thought that the holding call was a little
bit inadvertent and it wasn’t too bad a holding call but the penalty called
for 15 yards, should the referee be free to impose 10 yards because they
think that might be more fair? No. Of course, not. Those are the basic
principles of rules.56
With regard to the commitment to equal treatment, Senator Hatch (R-UT) referenced
the above-noted comment by Roberts and was emphatic in affirming that view. For
Hatch, the requirement of equal treatment across all persons via general rules was

54
Id. at 448 (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the
United States).
55
See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 21191 (2005) (statement of Sen. Frist (R-TN)); 151 CONG.
REC. 21207 (2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch (R-UT)); 151 CONG. REC. 21389 (2005)
(statement of Sen. Smith (R-OR)); 151 CONG. REC. 21399 (2005) (statement of Sen. Burns
(R-MT)); 151 CONG. REC. 21404 (2005) (statement of Sen. Talent (R-MO)); 151 CONG. REC.
21405 (2005) (statement of Sen. Thune (R-SD)); 151 CONG. REC. 21407 (2005) (statement
of Sen. Vitter (R-LA)); 151 CONG. REC. 21631 (2005) (statement of Sen. Lott (R-MS)); 151
CONG. REC. 21407 (2005) (statement of Sen. Bunning (R-KY)); 151 CONG. REC. 21417
(2005) (statement of Sen. Bennett (R-UT)); 151 CONG. REC. 21425 (2005) (statement of Sen.
Grassley (R-IA)).
56
151 CONG. REC. 21408 (2005) (statement of Sen. Sessions); see also 151 CONG. REC.
21206 (2005) (statement of Sen. DeWine (R-OH)).
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so obviously correct that he wondered how anyone could possibly stake out a critical
or opposing view. As he stated,
If my friends on the other side oppose this nomination, are they saying that
judges should instead be partial, that judges should actually take sides, that
people coming before the Court do not deserve the confidence that judges
will be fair? If that is what they believe, I invite them to try to make that
case to the American people. If not, if they agree with Judge Roberts that
judges should be impartial, then they should confirm his nomination.
...
If my friends on the other side oppose this nomination, are they arguing
that whoever the little guy might be must win, regardless of what the facts
and regardless of what the law requires? Are they saying judges should
disregard their oaths to do justice without respect to persons?57
Nevertheless, at least three themes run through the comments of those
somewhat more skeptical of the Roberts nomination and the arguments he put forth
in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Perhaps the most noteworthy critical
comment came from then-Senator Obama (D-IL), which encompassed critiques of
all three themes noted by Roberts supporters: the image of the law as objectively
clear; the claim of minimal discretion by judges in applying the law to specific cases;
and the purported fairness of such an approach to judging. As Obama noted in a
comment that explained his vote against Roberts’s nomination—and that
subsequently reappeared with a vengeance by critics of Sonia Sotomayor’s
nomination four years later58—he memorably stated:
The problem I face—a problem that has been voiced by some of my other
colleagues, both those who are voting for Mr. Roberts and those who are
voting against Mr. Roberts—is that while adherence to legal precedent and
rules of statutory or constitutional construction will dispose of 95 percent
of the cases that come before a court, so that both a Scalia and a Ginsburg
will arrive at the same place most of the time on those 95 percent of the
cases—what matters on the Supreme Court is those 5 percent of cases that
are truly difficult. In those cases, adherence to precedent and rules of
construction and interpretation will only get you through the 25th mile of
the marathon. That last mile can only be determined on the basis of one’s

57

151 CONG. REC. 21208 (2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch). See also 151 CONG. REC.
21414, 21415 (2005) (statement of Sen. Cornyn (R-TX)); 151 CONG. REC. 21633 (2005)
(statement of Sen. Bond (R-MO)); 151 CONG. REC. 21643, 21644 (2005) (statement of Sen.
McConnell (R-KY)).
58
See infra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
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deepest values, one’s core concerns, one’s broader perspectives on how
the world works, and the depth and breadth of one’s empathy.59
Obama thus introduced concerns about the objectivity of the law and Roberts’s claim
that proper judging entails minimal judicial discretion. Rather, Obama invoked the
possibility of “hard cases”60 to underscore the point that the conventional tools of
legal analysis may very well be unable to give us determinate answers in the types
of very difficult cases that the Supreme Court is likely to hear. If one accepts
Obama’s claim that a degree of indeterminacy may exist with conventional methods
of legal analysis, this in turn inevitably prompts skepticism about a second
component of the Roberts claim: that the judicial role requires minimal discretion
because the application of the law to a given case is generally nothing more than
calling “balls and strikes.” To the contrary, if legal analysis—and the content of the
law itself—may be characterized by a degree of indeterminacy, then any correct
evaluation of the judicial role has to grapple with the fact of inevitable judicial
discretion, and better or worse ways of applying that discretion by judges. Third,
this in turn led to Obama’s invocation of “empathy” as a necessary element of the
judicial application of the law.
Beyond Obama, probably the most interesting comment that directly took aim
at Roberts’s view of the law and the judicial role was a comment by then-Senator
Joe Biden (D-DE) in the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings. As Senator Biden
stated:
[I]n major league baseball, they have a rule—Rule 2.00 defines the strike
zone. It basically says from the shoulders to the knees. And the only
question about judges is, “do they have good eyesight or not?” They don’t
get to change the strike zone. They don’t get to say that was down around
the ankles, you know, and I think it was a strike. They don’t get to do that.
But you are in a very different position as a Supreme Court Justice. As you
pointed out, some places of the Constitution define the strike zone—twothirds of the Senators must vote, you must be an American citizen, to the
chagrin of Arnold Schwarzenegger, to be President of the United States—
I mean born in America to be a President of the United States. They are
all—the strike zone is set out. But as you pointed out in the question of
Senator Hatch, I think you said unreasonable search and seizure; what
constitutes unreasonable?
...
And the same thing prevails for a lot of other parts of the Constitution. The
one that we are all talking about and everybody here from left, right, and
center is concerned about is the Liberty Clause of the 14th Amendment. It
59
60

151 CONG. REC. 21032 (2005) (statement of Sen. Obama).
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81–83 (1977).
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doesn’t define it. All the things we debate about here, and the Court
debates, the 5–4 decisions, they are almost all on issues that are ennobling
phrases in the Constitution that the Founders never set a strike zone for.
You get to go back and decide . . . .61
If one proceeds from the view that application of the law encompasses
indeterminacy—and that judicial discretion is inevitable in this task—then one
returns to the conclusion of Obama’s statement: the need for an articulated standard
by which we might evaluate better or more legitimate applications of judicial
discretion.
Again, for Obama, the standard he emphasized was one linked to the
incorporation of empathy by judges in making legal judgments—or more
specifically, Obama endorsed a view of the judicial role where judges would show
a special solicitude for the less powerful and less fortunate.62 Others seized on this
theme to reject the Roberts view, and the view of his supporters, that proper and fair
judging required blindness to these social facts.63 One of the more eloquent
statements in this regard was by Senator Durbin (D-IL) during the Judiciary
Committee hearings:
[S]o frequently, when asked, you have said, appropriately, that you will be
driven and inspired by the rule of law, which is an appropriate term but a
hard and cold term by itself. We know you have the great legal mind and
have proven it here. But the questions that have been asked more and more
today really want to know what is in your heart, and I think those are
appropriate.
When you look down from the bench or read a trial transcript, do you just
see plaintiffs and parties and precedents, or more? Do you see the people
behind the precedents, the families behind the footnotes? I think that is
what many of us are driving at with these questions.

61

Roberts’s Confirmation Hearing, supra note 48, at 185 (statement of Sen. Joseph
Biden, Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary); see also id. at 512–13 (statement of Peter
B. Edelman, Professor of Law, Co-Director, Joint Degree in Law and Public Policy,
Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C.).
62
151 CONG. REC. 21032 (2005) (statement of Sen. Obama).
63
See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 21389, 21390 (2005) (statement of Sen. Harkin (D-IA));
151 CONG. REC. 21429 (2005) (statement of Sen. Inouye (D-HI)); 151 CONG. REC. 21431
(2005) (statement of Sen. Clinton (D-NY)); 151 CONG. REC. 21630 (2005) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy (D-MA)); 151 CONG. REC. 21630 (2005) (statement of Sen. Schumer (D-NY)); 151
CONG. REC. 21632 (2005) (statement of Sen. Akaka) (D-HI); 151 CONG. REC. 21637 (2005)
(statement of Sen. Corzine (D-NJ)); 151 CONG. REC. 21639 (2005) (statement of Sen.
Stabenow (D-MI)).
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You have lived a comfortable life. Court cases often involve people who
have not. Many times, contests between the powerful and the powerless,
as someone said in the opening statement, are contests where the
powerless just have the rule of law and the Constitution on their side,
praying for relief for their day in court.
Aside from a few pro bono cases, as important as they are—and I salute
you for being involved in them—what would the powerless, the
disenfranchised, minorities, and others see in your life experience that
would lead them to believe that they would have a fighting chance in your
Court?64
Encompassed within Durbin’s statement, and others with the same view,65 was the
presumption that judicial and legal legitimacy rests on something beyond the
aspiration toward pure procedural neutrality; more precisely, and more importantly,
it rests on substantive outcomes that positively impact the welfare of the
disadvantaged in American society. In other words, Durbin was invoking the
legitimacy of partiality, when deployed toward equitable goals.
Finally, before moving on to the Sotomayor nomination, it is worth
emphasizing some narrow points of commonality that might still be identified
between the positions staked out by Roberts and his supporters, and the positions
staked out by skeptics. First, recall the response by Roberts to the query from Senator
Grassley about whether “there [is] any room in constitutional interpretation for the
judge’s own values or beliefs?” Roberts’s reply, again, was:
No, I don’t think there is. Sometimes it’s hard to give meaning to a
constitutional term in a particular case. But you don’t look to your own
values and beliefs. You look outside yourself to other sources. This is the
basis for, you know, that judges wear black robes, because it doesn’t
matter who they are as individuals. That’s not going to shape their
decision. It’s their understanding of the law that will shape their decision.66
Roberts appeared to partially concede the point raised by Obama that legal
indeterminacy exists and that the conventional tools of legal analysis cannot
necessarily eliminate it. Furthermore, one suspects that Obama and other skeptics
would concede the assertion made by Roberts that judges should not feel free to
simply inject their own moral beliefs into legal interpretation without any sense of
professional or ethical constraint. The gap between these two perspectives lies,
however, with Roberts’s insistence that one’s understanding of the law can be
64
Roberts’s Confirmation Hearing, supra note 48, at 388 (statement of Sen. Richard
Durbin, Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary).
65
See infra note 71.
66
Roberts’s Confirmation Hearing, supra note 48, at 177–78 (statement of John G.
Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States).
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wholly separated from one’s values and beliefs. One suspects that for Obama and
others more comfortable with acknowledging the fact of judicial discretion, the idea
that one’s view of the law may indeed be linked to one’s larger values (about the
purpose of the Constitution, or the purpose of the American polity, or the meaning
of equality) would be neither surprising nor necessarily problematic.
Second, in response to a question from Senator Kyl (R-AZ) on the umpire
analogy, Roberts stated:
I know there are those theorists who think that is futile [to reach the “right”
legal answer], or because it is hard in particular cases, we should just throw
up our hands and not try in any case, and I do not subscribe to that. I
believe that there are right answers, and judges, if they work hard enough,
are likely to come up with them.67
Again, most of Roberts’s skeptics would likely have concurred with the view that
there are indeed “right” answers to legal questions, so this comment perhaps
minimized a point of likely convergence with them. Where there may have been
divergence was in the disinclination of Roberts to acknowledge, as his skeptics
might have, that there may be multiple right answers to a legal question, or that some
answers may be relatively better than others. As such, having faith that there are
correct legal answers does not eliminate having to potentially grapple with the
complexities of judicial discretion, notwithstanding what Roberts appeared to
suggest.
Third and finally, Roberts and Senator Durbin had an interesting exchange on
how the latter viewed the equality implications flowing from the former’s “neutral”
view of judging. In response to the comment mentioned above by Roberts that he
would rule in favor of “the little guy” or “the big guy” depending upon what the
Constitution commanded, Durbin responded with the following comment:
Would you at least concede that you would take into consideration that in
our system of justice the race goes to the swift, and the swift are those with
the resources, the money, the lawyers, the power in the system, and that
many times the powerless, the person who has struggled and clawed their
way to your courtroom, went through a wall of adversity which the
powerful never had to face? Is that part of your calculation?68
Roberts responded by saying:

67

Id. at 267 (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the
United States).
68
Id. at 448 (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin, Member, Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary).
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Absolutely, and it is, again, what’s carved above the doors to the Supreme
Court: “Equal Justice Under Law.” And the judicial oath talks about doing
justice without regard to persons, to rich and to poor. And that, of course,
is critically important . . . the judge’s obligation is to appreciate that the
rule of law requires that both of those be treated equally under the law.69
Thus, even if Roberts steadfastly refused to recognize any room for partiality or
special solicitude for the less fortunate in the legitimate exercise of judicial power,
he and Durbin at least converged on the notion of equal access to justice and equal
treatment for both rich and poor.
B. Defenses, Critiques, and Elaborations on Impartiality
in the Sotomayor Nomination
Picking up on his comments emphasizing the importance of empathy during
the Roberts nomination, President Obama stated the following in announcing the
retirement of Justice David Souter and his hopes for the next Supreme Court justice:
I will seek someone who understands that justice isn’t about some abstract
legal theory or footnote in a case book. It is also about how our laws affect
the daily realities of people’s lives -- whether they can make a living and
care for their families; whether they feel safe in their homes and welcome
in their own nation.
I view that quality of empathy, of understanding and identifying with
people’s hopes and struggles as an essential ingredient for arriving at [sic]
just decisions and outcomes. I will seek somebody who is dedicated to the
rule of law, who honors our constitutional traditions, who respects the
integrity of the judicial process and the appropriate limits of the judicial
role.70
Sonia Sotomayor was ultimately the nominee, and during her confirmation, those
Senators who supported her tended to emphasize a range of arguments that spoke to
the legitimacy of partiality in legal interpretation and as part of the judicial role. The
first set of arguments tracked Obama’s comments from both the Roberts nomination
and from his retirement announcement of Justice Souter: recognizing that judicial
discretion is part of the judicial role, and emphasizing the need for judges and
justices who would utilize this discretion with an eye to the lived experience of
69

Id. at 448–49 (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the
United States).
70
Obama’s Remarks on the Resignation of Justice Souter, reprinted in N.Y. TIMES,
(May 1, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/01/us/politics/01souter.text.html
[https://perma.cc/949F-W5RN]
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Senator

Setting aside all this [sic] politics, we should also never forget, never
overlook the historic role that judges play in protecting the less powerful
among us. We should always appreciate how a real-world understanding
of the real-life impact of judicial decisions is a proper and necessary part
of the process of judging.
Judge Sotomayor’s wide experience, I hope, will bring her a sense of the
difficult circumstances faced by the less powerful among us. . . If Justice
Sotomayor’s wide experience gives her empathy for those people so that
she gives them a full and fair hearing and seeks to understand the realworld impact of her decisions on them, she will be doing nothing wrong—
nothing wrong by the measure of history, nothing wrong by the measure
of justice.72
Beyond this, other Sotomayor defenders emphasized a legal tradition of judicial
rulings and past legislation that aimed to rectify structural disadvantages faced by
certain constituencies—and voiced their hope that Sotomayor would fall within this
tradition.73 Finally, others emphasized the benefits of Sotomayor herself adding to
the diversity of the Supreme Court’s personnel, with attendant benefits for both the
popular legitimacy of the institution and for the future development of the law itself.
For example, as Senator Durbin (D-IL) noted, someone with Sotomayor’s distinctive
life experiences should affect how a nine-person institutional body might grapple
with difficult legal issues:
Does anybody believe there is a clear, objective answer to every case that
comes before the Supreme Court? If they do, please explain to me why
one-third of all rulings in that Court in the last term were decided by a 5to-4 vote. Does anybody believe that women judges have not helped their
male colleagues understand the realities of sex discrimination and sexual
harassment in the workplace? Study after study has shown that men and
women on the bench sometimes rule differently in discrimination cases.
That is why diversity is so important. This doesn’t mean their rulings are
based on personal bias. It simply means that Americans see the world
through the prism of various experiences and perspectives. Our Supreme

71

See 155 CONG. REC. 20654 (2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy (D-VT)); 155 CONG.
REC. 20661, 20662 (2009) (statement of Sen. Feinstein (D-CA)); 155 CONG. REC. 20778
(2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy); 155 CONG. REC. 20846 (2009) (statement of Sen. Durbin
(D-IL)); 155 CONG. REC. 20848 (statement of Sen. Durbin).
72
155 CONG. REC. 20667 (2009) (statement of Sen. Whitehouse (D-RI)).
73
See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. 20654, 20655 (2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy (D-VT)).
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Court Justices should possess an equally rich and wide field of vision as
they interpret the facts and the law.74
The upshot of these various arguments was not necessarily a defense of
partiality for its own sake. As some of these speakers emphasized, these more
specific endorsements of partiality ultimately added up to a defense of a more
nuanced and more substantive form of impartiality. As Senator Leahy (D-VT) noted,
“What the partisan critics do not appreciate is that the opposite of empathy is
indifference and a lack of understanding. Empathy does not mean biased or mean
picking one side over another; it means understanding both sides.”75 Developing this
theme further, Senator Leahy pressed an almost Madisonian-esque argument that
greater inclusion of diverse perspectives would ensure a checking of biases that
might lead to a more realistically impartial judiciary:
By striving for a more diverse bench drawn from judges with a wider set
of backgrounds and experiences we can better ensure there will be no
prejudices and biases controlling our courts of justice. All nominees have
talked about the value they will draw on the bench from their backgrounds.
That diversity of experience and strength is not a weakness in achieving
an impartial judiciary.76
Not surprisingly, those more skeptical of the Sotomayor nomination
emphasized the illegitimacy of partiality. In doing so, they had two targets. The first
was Obama’s reference to empathy as part of his criteria in selecting a Supreme
Court nominee. The second target was a portion of a speech given by Sotomayor
herself in 2001 at the U.C. Berkeley Law School that specifically referenced her own
ethnic identity as a laudable influence upon her ability to perform the judicial role.
This was the comment in question:
Justice O’Connor has often been cited as saying that a wise old man and
wise old woman will reach the same conclusion in deciding cases. I am
not so sure Justice O’Connor is the author of that line since Professor
Resnik attributes that line to Supreme Court Justice Coyle. I am also not
so sure that I agree with the statement. First, as Professor Martha Minnow
74

155 CONG. REC. 20847 (2009) (statement of Sen. Durbin). See also 155 CONG. REC.
20655 (2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy); 155 CONG. REC. 20663 (2009) (statement of Sen.
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155 CONG. REC. 20713-14 (2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy (D-VT)); 155 CONG. REC. 20761
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(statement of Sen. Leahy).

938

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

has noted, there can never be a universal definition of wise. Second, I
would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences
would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who
hasn’t lived that life.77
The concerns raised by Sotomayor skeptics centered on at least three general themes
that, not surprisingly, often intersected. One theme was the specter of illegitimate
judicial activism. If empathy and solicitude for certain groups were accepted as a
legitimate part of the judicial role, Sotomayor skeptics feared this would give free
license to empathy-minded judges to proceed beyond the constraints of the law and
find the outcomes dictated by their heart or sense of sympathy, rather than what was
legitimately authorized in the Constitution or by federal statute. For example, thenSenator Sessions (R-AL) stated on this point:
Our legal system is built on a belief that there is a right answer to even the
most difficult cases, and judges ought to give their absolute best effort to
find that right answer. It is based on law and the facts and not what their
personal views and values are. That is what we are all about. I think it is
an important issue. And the activist, whether liberal or conservative, the
activist judge allows those values and prejudices and political views and
ideology to affect their rulings. It causes them to find some way to achieve
a result that furthers an agenda they believe in. That is not justice, that is
politics.78
Second, and relatedly, critics claimed that judicial empathy would always be a
matter of empathy toward some individual or specific group of individuals. This
implied an additional, more pointed worry: that judges empowered to rule with
empathy would be empowered to play favorites in the legal process, creating a
constituency of the legally privileged. As a result, the Sotomayor/Obama perspective
would imperil the very idea of impartiality as equal treatment through general rules
and give rise to the possibility of the worst kinds of partiality, perhaps akin to
nepotism or corruption. Indeed, Sotomayor herself explicitly articulated some selfconsciousness about these concerns in her Berkeley speech:
Yet, because I accept the proposition that, as Judge Resnik describes it, “to
judge is an exercise of power” and because as, another former law school
77
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classmate, Professor Martha Minnow of Harvard Law School, states
“there is no objective stance but only a series of perspectives-no neutrality,
no escape from choice in judging,” I further accept that our experiences as
women and people of color affect our decisions. The aspiration to
impartiality is just that—it’s an aspiration because it denies the fact that
we are by our experiences making different choices than others.79
As Senator McConnell (R-KY) stated in a comment that combined the favoritism
concern with the judicial activism concern:
[W]hen it comes to judging—empathy is only good if you are lucky
enough to be the person or group for whom the judge in question has
empathy. In those cases, it is the judge, not the law, which determines the
outcome. That is a dangerous road to go down if you believe, as I do, in a
nation not of men but of laws.80
Likewise, in the hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Coburn
(R-OK) stated the following:
The American people expect their judges to treat all litigants equally, not
to favor and not to enter the courtroom already prejudiced against one of
the parties. That is why Lady Justice is always depicted blind and why
Aristotle defined law as “reason free from passion.” Do we expect a judge
to merely call balls and strikes? Maybe so, maybe not. But we certainly do
not expect them to sympathize with one party over the other, and that is
where empathy comes from.81
Third, and finally, it is not hard to detect a point of concern raised about Sotomayor’s
reference to a “wise Latina” that, if not always explicit, seemed to be ever-present:
at least some Sotomayor skeptics seemed to feel a degree of insult or annoyance
about her remarks implying a kind of personal superiority of judgment or
perspective. Not surprisingly, this would be a potent point of criticism when a life-
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tenured position on the U.S. Supreme Court was on the line. For example, this was
Senator Grassley’s comment on the “wise Latina woman” phrase:
Since 1994, the judge has given a number of speeches where she
responded to a remark by Justice O’Connor that a judge’s gender should
be irrelevant to [the] judicial decision-making process. Judge Sotomayor
said that she “hope[d] that a wise Latina woman . . . would more often than
not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn’t lived that life.”
This statement suggests, very contrary to the Constitution, that race and
gender influence judicial decisions and that some judges can reach a
“better conclusion” solely on the basis of belonging to a particular
demographic.82
Before elaborating on some of the deeper threads of commonality across the
various perspectives on impartiality and partiality articulated in these two
nomination efforts, I should preliminarily note a point of convergence between
Roberts and Sotomayor. Compare these two comments—one is a passage from
Sotomayor’s Berkeley speech, and the other is a comment by Roberts during his
hearings in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee:
Each day on the bench I learn something new about the judicial process
and about being a professional Latina woman in a world that sometimes
looks at me with suspicion. I am reminded each day that I render decisions
that affect people concretely and that I owe them constant and complete
vigilance in checking my assumptions, presumptions and perspectives and
ensuring that to the extent that my limited abilities and capabilities permit
me, that I reevaluate them and change as circumstances and cases before
me requires. I can and do aspire to be greater than the sum total of my
experiences but I accept my limitations. I willingly accept that we who
judge must not deny the differences resulting from experience and heritage
but attempt, as the Supreme Court suggests, continuously to judge when
those opinions, sympathies and prejudices are appropriate.83
[O]f course, we [judges] all bring our life experiences to the bench. But I
will say this: that the ideal in the American justice system is epitomized
by the fact that judges, Justices, do wear the black robes, and that is meant
82
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to symbolize the fact that they’re not individuals promoting their own
particular views, but they are supposed to be doing their best to interpret
the law, to interpret the Constitution, according to the rule of law, not their
own preferences, not their own personal beliefs. That’s the ideal.84
At the level of aspiration, one might say there is a great deal of convergence between
the Sotomayor and Roberts perspectives on the judicial role. Their divergence seems
more a matter of their respective optimism about judges being able to put aside their
biases and to see beyond their own life experiences. Sotomayor was criticized for an
undertone of superiority in her wise Latina comment.85 However, it is ironic that she
attracted this criticism relative to Roberts because her comments in that speech also
demonstrated significantly greater humility about the exercise of judicial power and
the potential pitfalls of sitting in judgment of others who have vastly different life
experiences. 86 Ultimately these issues regarding the relative differences between
Sotomayor and Roberts in recognizing and articulating the limits of a judge’s
perspective, and how to respond to this shortfall accordingly, marks the primary
point of divergence between them—at least as suggested by the above quotations.
With that point made, let me return below to drawing out in greater detail the points
of convergence between these two justices, and their respective supporters.
C. Points of Commonality
The first area of notable convergence among all speakers in these confirmation
efforts is the outwardly-expressed belief that legal and judicial legitimacy requires a
kind of fairness implicating both legal process and legal outcomes. Namely, I would
assert that a common thread across most of these speakers is an outwardly-expressed
belief that legitimate judicial process—and the legitimate exercise of judicial
power—requires that a “fair chance” within the legal system be given for those
individuals similar to the speaker, or similar to constituencies that the speaker cares
about. Of course, what individuals think a “fair chance” entails for such individuals
is hardly a point of consensus in these debates, but I would maintain that this idea in
a more abstract sense encompasses both a procedural and substantive normative
ideal for speakers on both sides of these two confirmation efforts.
By way of beginning to unpack this point, consider the Republican side first—
those who were more oriented toward a pro-Roberts and anti-Sotomayor position in
84
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these debates. For these individuals, the procedural component of fairness was the
centerpiece of many of their arguments: there were many speakers who emphasized
that the essence of judicial fairness lay in the equal treatment of all according to
general rules.
However, few Republican Senators would have taken such statements at face
value and assumed that such defenses of impartiality were wholly divorced from
substantive legal outcomes. Indeed, in the debates themselves, some of these
speakers felt little hesitation in pairing this emphasis on generality and neutral
procedures with emphatic defenses of specific substantive goals. Thus, for most
Republican Senators, gun owners should fare better, in front of an impartial judge,
than those who would propose greater gun restrictions. In such situations, the mark
of judicial impartiality stemmed less from fidelity to any purportedly neutral
process, and more from fidelity to specific outcomes. For example, this was the
comment by Senator Coburn: “I remain concerned that Judge Sotomayor’s hostility
to gun rights, abortion restrictions, and property rights, among others, stem from a
‘personal prejudice’ that will influence her decisions once she is untethered from
precedent.”87 Of course, this type of special solicitude for social groups aligned with
the Republican Party would not qualify, under the Republican perspective, as
illegitimate favoritism because the basis for the seemingly favorable treatment of
these groups by like-minded judges would lie in the fact that these outcomes were
dictated—at least in theory—by the impartial administration of clearly defined, and
legitimately created constitutional rights.88
The substantive component of fairness, as endorsed by the Republican side in
these debates, is even more clearly illustrated in the critiques and attention they
placed on Sotomayor’s “wise Latina” remarks. As noted above, Republican critiques
about these remarks as antithetical to judicial impartiality were quite common, but
some went further to emphasize their annoyance with the hint of superiority implied
in Sotomayor’s assertion that someone with her background might reach a “better”
legal conclusion than a white male judge.89 From these starting points, it is not hard
to connect such critiques to the types of concerns voiced by Senator Coburn above
that focused on legal outcomes. Put more bluntly than what we saw in the debates,
and in a way that links both the procedural and substantive, one might readily
speculate that a Sotomayor critic worried that a judge like Sotomayor, with her
87
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distinctive way of looking at the world—born out of her ethnic identity and her
background—would be unlikely to look at the world in a way that would result in
just or fair outcomes to those with different ethnic identities or backgrounds.
For Sotomayor supporters/Roberts critics, the intertwinement of procedural and
substantive considerations in their larger notions of fairness and judicial legitimacy
can also be gleaned in these Senate debates. The substantive elements were, for
many, the central arguments in their skepticism about the Roberts’s nomination and
their endorsement of the Sotomayor nomination. Whether tied to societal
discrimination, unequal resources, or structural biases within the law itself,
achieving impartiality or fairness—under this view—requires judicial actors to
exhibit empathy or special solicitude for certain groups to reach a more substantive
equality.90 However, equally worthy of attention were the procedural elements
within the Democratic view as well. On this, it bears emphasizing that Sotomayor
had little appetite for expanding upon her anxieties about judicial impartiality during
her confirmation hearings91 or elaborating on the role of empathy in judging.92 Her
statement in response to a question from Senator Schumer during her confirmation
hearings illustrates this point:
Senator SCHUMER. But let us start with the basics. Will you commit to
us today that you will give every litigant before the court a fair shake and
that you will not let your personal sympathies toward any litigant overrule what the law requires?
Judge SOTOMAYOR. That commitment I can make and have made for
17 years.93
Notwithstanding some of the larger points she raised in her Berkeley speech, judicial
legitimacy—even for Democrats like Senator Schumer—had to rest in part on
broader procedural norms that constrain and limit the degree of judicial solicitude
that might be extended to certain social groups under the law.
What emerges then is a view about impartiality and fairness that is quite similar
across both parties, even if there might be more candor about this view from the
Democratic side. Fairness necessarily entails a set of impersonal procedures one step
removed from pressing controversies—in line with Wechsler’s famous definition of
neutral principles94—but the plausibility or attractiveness of those procedures is
measured against the substantive outcomes they generate. We might go even one
90
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step further in highlighting convergence on the substantive requirements that would
amount to, or legitimate, procedures: even here, I think senators from both parties
converge on the abstract ideal that certain social groups be assured of receiving a
fair chance or a fair shake in front of an impartial judge. The specific groups entitled
to this solicitude, and the precise content of a “fair chance,” are clearly items where
no likely consensus among Senators would occur. But one might presume a common
aspiration that judges be able to look beyond themselves to see life through the eyes
of those unlike them. Nothing about this perspective would sound foreign or
misaligned with most Democratic arguments.95 I believe this perspective underlies
much of the concern about the Sotomayor nomination on the Republican side as
well.96
A second point of convergence lies in the apparent agreement of all that debates
about legal and judicial legitimacy should be about something different than pure
partisanship. To be sure, charges of base partisanship certainly appear in these
debates. Neither party was shy about claiming that the other party had members
motivated by less than noble purposes for the positions that they took in these
nominations.97 But in the very act of making these charges, and as apparent
throughout the discussion in the preceding Part, speakers of all stripes acknowledged
that legal legitimacy must rest on constraints that may be absent from a more general
political debate. This is an unsurprising position for an individual, like Roberts, who
claimed that the core value of judges lay in being impartial98—the very antithesis of
partisanship. Indeed, as Roberts himself insisted in his opening statement, “I have
no platform. Judges are not politicians who can promise to do certain things in
exchange for votes.”99 Equally significant, however, is that for those individuals who
95
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would endorse the legitimacy of some partiality in the law, this constraint was also
very real.100
Third and finally, it is possible to detect a middle ground in these debates about
the nature of the law itself. On the one hand, the indeterminacy of the law in some
respects is hard to deny. The prevalence of 5-4 votes in many high-profile areas of
constitutional law101 provides skepticism about a more formalist view of the law
where objectively right answers exist, waiting to be discovered by judges who
simply work hard enough.102 However, no one—not even Sotomayor—had the
appetite to go totally in the other direction and claim that the law was wholly
indeterminate and subject to political whim or contingency. To go in this direction
would be to entertain the fear of partisanship discussed above, but even more
fundamentally, undermine the aspiration of the rule of law as a stabilizing force
worthy of our respect, and capable of binding a diverse polity together.103 So what
we are left with is a view of the law as somewhere in between—partly indeterminate,
but determinate enough to be different from mere political will.
III. PARTY IDEOLOGIES AND JUDICIAL MODESTY
As evident in the preceding discussion of the Roberts and Sotomayor hearings,
themes of generality and partiality recurred in Senate discussions about the judicial
role. Both ideals informed competing perspectives on judicial impartiality,
specifically with respect to how judges might fairly or impartially apply the law to
discrete parties. And while it is unlikely that any of the speakers quoted in the
preceding Part would have subscribed to an ideal of generality or partiality in
totality, the former aligned more frequently with Republican Senators (and Chief
Justice Roberts), while the latter more frequently aligned with Democratic Senators
(and Justice Sotomayor).104
From that initial observation, this Part addresses two related questions. First,
what might account for this divergence between Democrats and Republicans on the
100
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nature of judicial impartiality? That is, what elements within the Democratic and
Republican parties might predispose each to a distinctive view of the judicial role?
Second, even if we see this partisan divergence in the Senate debates, it nevertheless
leaves unanswered the distinct question concerning how such ideals are actually
applied in adjudication. Do these notions of generality and partiality, as articulated
in the Senate debates, appear as such in the constitutional rulings written by the
Court?
In this Part, I will offer some tentative answers to these questions. In doing so,
I will ultimately flesh out, in a preliminary fashion, a descriptive argument about
certain Supreme Court behaviors in the contemporary context. In brief, Sections A
and B below will locate the Democratic affinity for partiality and the Republican
affinity for generality within both the coalitional structure and the ideological
orientation of each party. However, as I will discuss in Section C, we should not
necessarily expect these elements of party ideology to be perfectly transposed into
judicial opinions. Rather, notwithstanding their points of ideological divergence,
more liberal and more conservative Supreme Court justices occupy a shared
institutional environment by virtue of their shared membership on the Court. As
such, justices of different ideological persuasions must navigate a common political
and institutional context that, at least since the beginning of the Roberts Court, has
been marked by persistent judicial uncertainty. Thus, only after judicial notions of
partiality or generality are altered through this shared context of judicial-institutional
caution can we finally get a glimpse of how these divergent notions of judicial
impartiality are actually applied in contemporary adjudication.105
A. Party Logics: Democrats
My first claim is that the divergence between the two parties on judicial
impartiality is strongly linked to the coalitional and ideological characteristics of
each party. For the Democrats, their affinity for partiality perhaps lies within the
very DNA of the party. At root, an endorsement of partiality entails a belief that
American society possesses distinct constituencies and social classes, and that some
of these constituencies and social classes are subject to particular hardships and
challenges that are worthy of being recognized by governmental actors.106 The
origins of this belief within the Democratic Party go back to the Jacksonian
105
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Democrats, who emphasized the social welfare and worthiness of laborers and
agrarians, as opposed to the more repugnant and corrupt investor and financial
classes.107 This is what Jackson himself stated in the most memorable passage of his
veto of the Second Bank of the United States:
It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of
government to their selfish purposes. Distinctions in society will always
exist under every just government. Equality of talents, of education, or of
wealth can not be produced by human institutions. In the full enjoyment
of the gifts of Heaven and the fruits of superior industry, economy, and
virtue, every man is equally entitled to protection by law; but when the
laws undertake to add to these natural and just advantages artificial
distinctions, to grant titles, gratuities, and exclusive privileges, to make the
rich richer and the potent more powerful, the humble members of
society—the farmers, mechanics, and laborers—who have neither the time
nor the means of securing like favors to themselves, have a right to
complain of the injustice of their Government. There are no necessary
evils in government. Its evils exist only in its abuses. If it would confine
itself to equal protection, and, as Heaven does its rains, shower its favors
alike on the high and the low, the rich and the poor, it would be an
unqualified blessing. In the act before me there seems to be a wide and
unnecessary departure from these just principles.108
The Jacksonians incorporated this segmented view of American society into a
larger view of federal governmental laissez-faire. For them, federal governmental
action was to be discouraged since any such actions were perceived to more likely
favor the investor and financial classes. In contrast, a posture of federal
governmental laissez-faire would work to the advantage of the laboring and agrarian
class.109 Still, a segmented view of American society and a corollary belief in the
special solicitude due to certain classes—what we might call a “class political”
perspective110—does not logically require a belief in governmental laissez-faire.
Indeed, toward the end of the nineteenth century, Democratic Party ideology
would—thanks to the influence of agrarian populists—fuse a class political
perspective with a demand for federal government intervention to alleviate the
particular hardship of certain constituencies.111
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Aspects of this populist view ultimately culminated in the ideology of the New
Deal Democrats in the 1930s, with its focus on urban workers and agrarians, and its
commitment to a federal social welfare state to alleviate the Depression Erahardships of these and other worthy constituencies against the predation of
“economic royalists.”112 In many respects, this basic ideology still orients the
modern Democratic Party. The constituent parts of the Democratic Party coalition
have changed with the gradual disappearance of Southern Democrats from the Party
through the course of the twentieth century (who have become Republicans) and the
increased focus within the Party in recent years on social groups defined by status
characteristics such as race, gender, and sexual orientation.113 Still, the class political
perspective remains as central as ever.114 Accordingly, commentators have often
characterized the modern Democratic Party as more a big-tent organization
constituted by a diversity of social and interest groups and held together by a
relatively thin ideology focused on significant policy positions.115 Unsurprisingly,
such a party would be inclined to an ideal of partiality in the judicial application of
the law.
Beyond its history and its ideology, the Democratic Party’s affinity for
partiality is also evident in some of the key jurisprudential themes articulated by
Democratic-appointed justices and progressive-leaning legal theorists over the
twentieth century. To highlight a few brief examples: Carolene Products’s Footnote
Four stands out as one of the most prominent statements in constitutional doctrine
in defense of the ideal of partiality. Chief Justice Stone—himself an FDR appointee
to the Chief Justice position—hinted in Footnote Four’s memorable third paragraph
that heightened judicial scrutiny could be appropriate for laws that targeted
“religious,” “national,” or “racial” minorities, or for laws that encompassed
“prejudice against discrete and insular minorities.”116
A commitment to partiality was also front and center in the Warren Court’s
assault on racial apartheid in the South in the middle of the twentieth century—
including, most prominently, Brown v. Board of Education’s prohibition of
segregation in public schools.117 And the significance of partiality was likewise
112
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evident in much of the legal scholarship inspired by the Warren Court’s work, such
as John Hart Ely’s theory of representation-reinforcement118 and Owen Fiss’s
articulation of an anti-subordination or “group disadvantaging” principle in
constitutional equal protection.119
Finally, one additional point should be noted about the Democratic Party’s
affinity for partiality in more recent years. As already indicated in the preceding
Part, the Democratic endorsement of partiality has often been almost tentative. The
most visible illustration of this in the prior Part was Sotomayor’s apparent need to
distance herself from the clear implication of her “wise Latina” speech, and to
endorse generality-friendly platitudes in her confirmation hearings.120
Sotomayor’s hesitation in offering a full-throated defense of partiality reveals
much about which values are dominant in public discourse. It also reveals the sense
of caution a Supreme Court nominee might acutely feel about wading into topics
perceived as controversial. But read more expansively, Sotomayor’s comments
might be seen to align with the observation of others that at the present time, the
Democratic Party—and by implication, its preferred judicial appointees—lack a
fully-formed coherent ideology about partiality.
Perhaps ironically, then-professor and now-Justice Elena Kagan once noted
exactly this point in 1995, in the aftermath of the Ginsburg and Breyer confirmations
to the Supreme Court: “Herein lies one of the mysteries of modern confirmation
politics: given that the Republican Party has an ambitious judicial agenda and the
Democratic Party has next to none, why is the former labeled the party of judicial
restraint and the latter the party of judicial activism?”121
More recently, Robert Post and Reva Siegel said this about Democratic or
progressive constitutional narratives:
Surprisingly, in recent years, it has been liberals, rather than conservatives,
who have been unable to find ways to connect constitutional vision to
living political values. In recent confirmation hearings, for example,
liberals have defended the constitutional values of the Warren Court by
invoking stare decisis and by emphasizing the importance of protecting
constitutional law from the taint of politics . . .
It is telling that liberals invoke the authority of judges and cases, while
conservatives invoke the Constitution itself. To advance their
constitutional vision, progressives emphasize the importance of respecting
118
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precedent and assert the professional autonomy of judges. They have been
maneuvered into upholding the very detachment of law from politics that
is the central premise of the jurisprudence of originalism thereby
contradicting liberalism's own insight about the importance of a living
constitutionalism.122
This tentative embrace of partiality also demands an explanation, and I think recent
Democratic Party politics related to the courts contains a partial answer. After the
Warren Court era and beginning with the Burger Court, Democrats have largely
enjoyed the benefit of having key precedents align with their party values such as
the right to an abortion or affirmative action.123 At the same time, such issues have
remained live legal controversies over the past several decades.
Numbers tell some of the story. In his 1957 article, Robert Dahl stated the
following about trends in Supreme Court appointments up to that point in history:
[o]ver the whole history of the Court, on the average one new justice has
been appointed every twenty-two months. Thus a president can expect to
appoint about two new justices during one term of office; and if this were
not enough to tip the balance on a normally divided Court, he is almost
certain to succeed in two terms.124
Recent history has not aligned with these averages. Presidents Clinton, W. Bush,
and Obama were all two-term presidents, and each succeeded in making only two
appointments to the Supreme Court—thus hardly doing much to shift the balance of
the Court.125 However, going a little further back into history, there was a sequence
of Republican presidents who had significantly better luck with Supreme Court
appointments. Perhaps most conspicuously, Nixon was able to make four
appointments to the Court in the span of about five years, thus ushering in the
transition from the Warren to the Burger Courts.126 Ford made one more
appointment—Justice Stevens—upon ascending to the presidency after
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Watergate.127 Following Carter’s presidency, which yielded no Supreme Court
appointments, Reagan added three new justices while also elevating Rehnquist to
Chief Justice.128 Finally, George H.W. Bush, in the span of one term, added two new
justices—Souter and Thomas.129
Focusing on the party identity of the president nominating a Supreme Court
justice has obvious limitations as a means of trying to gain a sense about the
ideological leanings of a Court—particularly since some of the justices appointed
by Republican presidents during these years included some notable and regular
defenders of liberal positions such as Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter.130 But
the general point is that if one is inclined to look at the Supreme Court’s ideological
composition from a baseline of political party affiliation, Democratic-appointed
justices have been able to keep some constitutional issues close—in terms of vote
counts—in the past few decades solely because of support from the three justices
noted above, and swing-voting Republican-appointed justices such as Powell,
O’Connor, and Kennedy.131 Given the available votes on the Court in recent decades,
it is no surprise that the past several decades have not seen the flowering of an
aggressive and full-throated liberal jurisprudence. The votes have simply not been
there. And even with respect to liberal Democratic justices, such as Ginsburg or
Breyer, present on the Supreme Court during these years, they have not been as
strongly liberal on issues of civil rights as earlier justices such as an Earl Warren or
a William Brennan.132
Given this context, it is perhaps not surprising that the Democratic Party’s
membership and leadership have either felt less compelled or less empowered to put
forth a more empathic and principled defense of partiality (much less a more
expansive liberal legal ideology). With little room to maneuver, and with a number
of key precedents still on the books like Roe v. Wade133 that require nothing more
from Democrats than successful defense, perhaps it is not so surprising that the
Party’s approach has been one of incrementalism and caution.
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B. Party Logics: Republicans
By way of contrast, consider the Republican Party’s affinity for generality, as
suggested by the discussion in Part II. At a basic level, Republican Party ideology
has aligned with generality principles since the Party’s roots in the Whig Party in
the middle of the nineteenth century. The Whigs, like the Republican Party that later
replaced it, were centered on an ideal of a relatively more class-less society, where
in theory all held the equal opportunity to rise (or fall) on the basis of their talent and
hard work.134 According to this view, segmentations in American society were—if
anything—only temporary divisions.135 The Republican Party elevated such notions
to be its organizing principle of free labor; hence, its opposition to the aristocracy of
Southern slaveholders and slavery itself stemmed from a view of those
constituencies as antithetical to an ideal of a relatively class-less, mobile, and fluid
American society.136 Such notions likewise help explain the Republican Party’s
roots in both the working-class and the wealthier classes, since the former could,
again in theory, aspire to be the latter within a generation.137 These notions
subsequently informed the Republican Party’s core beliefs behind key legislation
such as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment, which
enshrined, first statutorily and then constitutionally, a general principle of “equality
before the law.”138
Beyond its aversion to segmentation and class politics, there is an element of
ideological fundamentalism in contemporary Republican discussions of the law as
well, evident in the preceding Part. The fundamentalism likely has its roots, at least
in part, in more recent political and legal history. First, if the modern Democratic
Party is generally viewed as more pluralistic and focused on particular issues and
groups without an overriding philosophy, Republicans have generally been
perceived as more socially homogenous and ideologically cohesive.139 No doubt a
crucial reason for this has been, at least in part, the prominent place of “movement
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conservatism” in the Republican Party since at least Reagan’s election in 1980.140
The end result is a party oriented more toward well-defined markers of ideological
commonality—one of which is the Party’s affinity for generality in the application
of the law.141
Further, the actions of the Warren Court and its legacy have undoubtedly
shaped the contemporary Republican Party as much as the contemporary
Democratic Party.142 As the party situated on the conservative end of legal and policy
disputes surrounding the rights of groups defined by race, gender, sexual orientation,
and economic class, it is not surprising that Republican senators and a Republican
nominee such as John Roberts would be more skeptical of ideals that demand special
judicial solicitude for these groups. Further, the Republican Party’s long-running
antipathy toward the Warren Court and its remaining precedents143 likely played a
role during the Roberts nomination in stoking this ideological zeal: indeed, the more
emphatic ideological orientation of Republicans in promoting the ideal of generality
might be understood as the work of the zealous reformer seeking to rally enough
support to undo an unjust and illegitimate status quo.
Finally, although the topic of originalism garnered more attention in subsequent
confirmation hearings and debates, it did get some discussion in the Roberts and
Sotomayor hearings.144 The originalist methodology, also rooted in Republican
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dissatisfaction with the work of the Warren Court,145 exemplifies and embodies (at
least in some forms) many of the themes encompassed within the comments
supportive of, or voiced by, Roberts—a belief in the objectivity of the law;146 a belief
that judicial discretion can be limited; and, related to the preceding point, a belief
that judicial impartiality is closely tethered to judicial modesty.147 Likely because of
the influence of movement conservatism, the Republican Party’s endorsement of
originalism carries ideological confidence that is distinct from contemporary
Democrats.148 As noted above, from Democratic appointees we see an approach that
is both more cautious and more pragmatic.
C. Judicial-Institutional Logics
Notwithstanding the various historical, institutional, and legal factors that have
led Democrats to diverge from Republicans in their respective notions of judicial
impartiality, and notwithstanding this divergence between the Democratic and
Republican Supreme Court nominees discussed here, there is also a point of
convergence for Supreme Court justices of both parties. Even if they may otherwise
depart on many points, every member of the Court faces certain common broader
judicial-institutional constraints.
The two factors that are worthy of emphasis here speak to constraints internal
and external to the Court. First, the current Court, like the Rehnquist Court that
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preceded it, has been marked by a perpetual state of close division.149 Particularly in
the area of equal protection, which speaks to the doctrinal focus in the next Part,
sharply split votes are rather common.150 Further, given the swing-voting status of
Justices Lewis Powell, Sandra Day O’Connor, and Anthony Kennedy in this
doctrinal area, they have had outsized influence in the major rulings during this
period (though the appointment of Justice Kavanaugh, of course, is likely to shift
the Court rightward).151
The second institutional constraint worthy of emphasis is the intensely
competitive and polarizing nature of electoral politics outside the Court. As an
indicator of the intensely competitive nature of current politics, divided government
has been the dominant condition of the federal government since Richard Nixon’s
election in 1968.152 In the 26 Congresses elected from 1968 to 2018, 19 have been
part of divided governments, while only 7 have been part of unified governments.153
By comparison, in the 26 Congresses elected between 1914 through 1966, the
numbers are almost exactly reversed: 20-unified and 6-divided.154 In short, like the
Court itself, the elected branches of the federal government have been subject to a
persistent state of uncertainty, with neither party able to gain decisive control for
any sustained period of time. Furthermore, this state of persistent, divided
government has been marked by heightened political polarization and increased
ideological homogeneity within each party.155 Especially in comparison to the
extended influence of the New Deal Democratic coalition in the middle portion of
the twentieth century, it is difficult to identify any analogous dominance by either
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party at the federal governmental level in recent decades, where clear governing
principles, as articulated by a dominant governing coalition, are present.156
These two electoral dynamics—intense partisan competition and
polarization—are plausibly related to one another. As Frances Lee notes about
partisan competition in Congress, an intensely competitive environment heightens
the impulses for partisan conflict.157 The realistic and tantalizing possibility for
either party to actually capture control of Congress—and subsequently pass their
preferred legislation—drives both parties to dig in and focus on securing electoral
victory.158 Left by the wayside is any inclination to bipartisanship, which may bring
about more concrete and timely legislative progress, but would do little to help either
party advance its cause toward institutional control.159 Lee contrasts the current
intensely competitive context with the long era of Democratic dominance of
Congress from the New Deal through 1980. During the latter period, she suggests
that the lessening of partisan competition in that period may have contributed to
greater congressional productivity.160
The long-running delicate balance of votes on the Court, combined with a
persistent state of intensely competitive electoral politics at the federal level, create
a common institutional context of judicial uncertainty in some high-profile areas of
constitutional law. That is, common to both Democratic and Republican justices in
the contemporary era is that within these doctrinal areas, judicial majorities are
narrow and thus, unstable. Further, while key jurisprudential markers set by the
Court may be relatively free from persistent, direct congressional or presidential
challenge given the fluid and competitive nature of electoral politics, this same
electoral context also provides a weak foundation for long-term jurisprudential
developments as well: if neither more liberal or more conservative of justices have
to worry about a reliable and persistent enemy in the elected branches, neither group
can reliably count on the elected branches for support too. Since the chances of either
party attaining long-term dominance akin to the New Deal Democratic coalition
seems unlikely in the foreseeable future, this condition of uncertainty seems likely
to persist for judicial actors; justices of both parties on the Court will not be able to
confidently rely upon a certain set of electoral conditions to exist.
Thus, what justices face today is a common context of uncertainty that is
decidedly not conducive to fleshing out stable, orderly, and rational developments
in controversial areas of the law. Where judicial majorities can be made or undone
by the idiosyncrasies of a swing-voting justice or by the unpredictable timing of a
justice’s retirement or death, and where there is no real tethering of the Court to a
156
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dominant governing coalition,161 justices must reckon with an especially heightened
degree of uncertainty and unsteadiness about the possibilities and pathways for
future legal developments.
This leads to a second claim: to understand how Democratic and Republican
notions of judicial impartiality are articulated and applied in contemporary
constitutional cases; one has to be attentive to the twin logics of the party and the
judiciary. It is the intersection of these logics that explain this facet of judicial
behavior. Stated in brief, for the Democrats, their already modest jurisprudential
agenda is even further scaled down in a context of judicial uncertainty.162
Democratic or liberal justices may defend core party values in their opinions and
votes, along with key precedents from the liberal high-point of the Warren Court
era.163 But for these justices, legal arguments center on technicalities and narrower
precedent-based arguments that betray a cautious, pragmatic spirit.164
In contrast to central rulings from the Warren Court era like Brown,165 or
Griswold166 or even Roe167 during the Burger Court, where the rulings ultimately set
a doctrinal agenda that would carry forward for decades, contemporary race and
equal protection opinions are marked by a different orientation.168 Indeed, it is a
point of irony that perhaps the most theoretically deep and abstract writing we have
seen from the Court in recent years, in service of liberal outcomes, has been from
Justice Kennedy––the Court’s swing vote in a series of decidedly incremental and
modest rulings on gay rights from Romer169 through Obergefell.170
In contrast, the context of judicial uncertainty shapes the behavior of
Republican justices differently. Given their orientation toward generality—and
given their more ambitious ideological agenda—this context prompts a scaling down
of principle to slightly different effect than what appears with the Democratic
justices. For Republican justices, assertions of broad principle with potentially
expansive reach are not uncommon in the contemporary context.171 However, such
statements or assertions—at least the ones that reside in majority opinions—rarely
challenge core doctrinal structures or threaten to undo core doctrinal principles
developed in preceding decades.172 The opinions of Republican justices then are,
unlike those of Democratic justices, more emphatic and ambitious in their
161
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deployment of constitutional principle.173 However, similar to the opinions of
Democratic justices, the effects or consequences of these opinions by Republican
justices are contained and limited in their potential scope (even if they still carry
quite significant consequences for the controversies and litigants in question).174 If
the progressive or liberal critique of the Court’s liberal justices is that they lack
vision or ambition, the complaint that conservatives might state about the Court’s
Republican justices is somewhat different: that even if they possess ideological
ambition, they fail to live up to it.175
IV. AN EXAMINATION OF JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY IN THE ROBERTS COURT’S
OPINIONS ON RACE AND EQUAL PROTECTION
With the preceding points in mind, let me now offer some tentative illustration
of them by discussing perhaps the four most significant rulings so far on race and
equal protection by the Roberts Court: its decision on voluntary school integration
plans in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,176
its most recent statements on higher education affirmative action admissions in
Fisher v. Texas I177 and Fisher v. Texas II,178 and its upholding of a Michigan state
constitutional amendment banning affirmative action in a wide range of state
governmental actions in Schuette v. BAMN.179
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A. Judicial Arguments in Support of Generality
Roberts’s opinion for the Court in Parents Involved stayed close to Republican
Party orthodoxy in endorsing a principle of color-blindness while striking down the
race-conscious student assignment plans at issue there.180 This principle of colorblindness (or the anti-classification principle) views both invidious and benign racial
classifications in the law as deeply problematic.181 As such, the anti-classification
principle demands that governmental actors, including judicial actors, provide equal
treatment to individuals of different races—thereby speaking to a principle of
generality.
Thus, in rejecting racial balancing in school composition as a compelling or
even legitimate governmental purpose,182 Roberts stated:
Accepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest would justify the
imposition of racial proportionality throughout American society, contrary
to our repeated recognition that “[a]t the heart of the Constitution’s
guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the
Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components
of a racial, religious, sexual or national class.” Allowing racial balancing
as a compelling end in itself would “effectively assur[e] that race will
always be relevant in American life, and that the ‘ultimate goal’ of
‘eliminating entirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant
factors as a human being’s race’ will never be achieved.”183
And then, in referencing Brown v. Board of Education itself, Roberts offered perhaps
the most memorable lines of the Parents Involved opinion:
Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and could not
go to school based on the color of their skin. The school districts in these
cases have not carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should
allow this once again—even for very different reasons. For schools that
never segregated on the basis of race, such as Seattle, or that have removed
the vestiges of past segregation, such as Jefferson County, the way “to
achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a
nonracial basis,” is to stop assigning students on a racial basis. The way to
stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the
basis of race.184
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The same point was made even more emphatically in Justice Thomas’s concurrence
in that case. Thomas acknowledged that race-conscious remedies could be
appropriate in the narrow circumstances of remedying discrete, formalized acts of
past racial discrimination.185 Beyond this narrow context, Thomas aligned with
generality principles in demanding that governmental actors generally refrain from
engaging in race-conscious actions.186 Indeed, Thomas’s categorical endorsement of
a “colorblind Constitution”—and by implication, colorblind judicial impartiality—
led him to an extended commentary on the equivalence of race-conscious benign
governmental action and Jim Crow segregation.187
Similar reflections of Republican Party orthodoxy were aired in Thomas’s
concurrence in Fisher I, where he discussed the University of Texas’s affirmative
action admissions program and also repeated the comparison to Jim Crow
segregation.188 Taking the logic of the generality principle to its logical
jurisprudential conclusion, Thomas, writing only for himself, further stated his
general skepticism of diversity-based justifications for affirmative action.189 He
stated that he would overrule the Court’s prior acceptance of race-conscious
admissions in higher education in Grutter v. Bollinger.190 In a similar vein, though
he did not go so far as to equate affirmative action to Jim Crow segregation, Alito’s
opinion for himself, Roberts, and Thomas in Fisher II emphatically endorsed
principles of color-blindness and generality.191
Finally, in Schuette v. BAMN, central in that case were the “political-process”
precedents of Reitman v. Mulkey, 192 Hunter v. Erikson,193 and Washington v. Seattle
School District No. 1194 which potentially supported the judiciary providing special
solicitude for racial minorities facing certain adverse governmental actions. In
endorsing a principle of generality, Justice Scalia—also writing for Thomas—
argued for overruling Hunter and Seattle.195 Scalia further stated the following, in
line with the preceding points:
In the years since Seattle, we have repeatedly rejected “a reading of the
guarantee of equal protection under which the level of scrutiny varies
185
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according to the ability of different groups to defend their interests in the
representative process.” Meant to obliterate rather than endorse the
practice of racial classifications, the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees
“obtai[n] with equal force regardless of ‘the race of those burdened or
benefitted.’” The Equal Protection Clause “cannot mean one thing when
applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of
another color. If both are not accorded the same protection it is not
equal.”196
Still, one would be mistaken if they concluded that the most consequential
rulings in these cases were mostly constituted by the arguments found in Thomas’s
concurrences in Fisher I and Parents Involved. In Roberts’s opinion for the Court in
Parents Involved, his first extended argument centered on subjecting the enrollment
plans in question to the Court’s well-established strict scrutiny analysis.197 This
underscores the point that on the whole, the endorsement of generality principles by
these conservative-leaning justices has been moderated by a felt need—against a
background of judicial uncertainty—to anchor these arguments in established
precedents and doctrinal technicality. In this vein, Roberts was clear in his Parents
Involved opinion in conceding the constitutionality of Grutter and the latter’s
endorsement of race-conscious admissions decisions in higher education.198
Similarly, in Alito’s dissent in Fisher II (writing also for Roberts and Thomas), his
endorsement of generality was based on a largely technical doctrinal critique of the
University of Texas affirmative action plan, and how it failed the narrow tailoring
requirement of strict scrutiny.199 And even in reaching this conclusion, Alito
conceded an exception to a principle of strict color-blindness in allowing that
governmental actors might pursue benign race-conscious measures if done so
without the use of explicit racial classifications.200
Likewise, in Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Schuette (in which Roberts
and Alito joined his opinion), his upholding of the Michigan state constitutional
amendment at issue there was considerably more cautious than Scalia’s concurring
opinion. Kennedy began by stating that there was no question in the present case
about the constitutionality of voluntarily adopted race-conscious affirmative action
in higher education, an issue that had already been settled in Grutter.201 The Court’s
focus was strictly on the Michigan state constitutional amendment prohibiting state
and other governmental entities from employing race-based preferences, and thus its
analysis centered on the political-process precedents in ultimately upholding the
amendment, and in endorsing generality principles.202
196
197
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Perhaps the best illustration of how Republican Party principles have been
moderated within these cases was Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Parents
Involved, where given his partial joining of Roberts’s opinion and given the sharp
split in votes between the other eight justices, portions of Kennedy’s opinion could
be read as the effective holding in that case.
Befitting his role as the swing-voting justice on race and equal protection cases
during this period, Kennedy aligned with the conservative bloc in endorsing the
established doctrinal framework that embodied the Republican Party ideal of
generality, and that reflected skepticism of benign racial classifications.203
Furthermore, in endorsing the Court’s well-established distinction between de jure
and de facto segregation, Kennedy clearly had no appetite for unsettling the Court’s
long-running aversion to viewing racial balancing as a compelling or even legitimate
governmental purpose, absent discrete and formalized past racial discrimination.204
And yet, befitting a spirit of moderation, Kennedy was also clear in finding a
limited degree of partiality to be constitutional and appropriate for governmental
actors and judicial actors to consider. In particular, Kennedy departed from the four
votes in the conservative bloc by giving explicit recognition to the legitimacy of
race-conscious governmental action that stopped short of explicit racial classifying:
The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate interest
government has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless
of their race. The plurality’s postulate that “[t]he way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
race” is not sufficient to decide these cases. Fifty years of experience since
Brown v. Board of Education, should teach us that the problem before us
defies so easy a solution. School districts can seek to reach Brown’s
objective of equal educational opportunity. The plurality opinion is at least
open to the interpretation that the Constitution requires school districts to
ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in schooling. I cannot endorse
that conclusion. To the extent the plurality opinion suggests the
Constitution mandates that state and local school authorities must accept
the status quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly
mistaken.205
This view, when joined with the four votes on the liberal bloc, suggests that partiality
remained an appropriate element within equal protection jurisprudence and within
the judicial approach to evaluating race-conscious governmental actions.
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B. Judicial Arguments in Support of Partiality
This cautious approach from Kennedy in Parents Involved was likewise present
in his rulings for the Court in Fisher I and Fisher II. In Fisher I, Kennedy was careful
to clarify that Grutter’s upholding of race-based higher education admissions was
not in question.206 The issue in front of the Court was instead a particular question
surrounding the constitutionality of the race-conscious admission plans at the
University of Texas207 and concerned whether the narrow tailoring prong of strict
scrutiny had been satisfied by one of those plans.208 To the latter question, Kennedy
ultimately offered a fact-specific and narrow “yes.”209 Ginsburg’s dissent in Fisher
I repeats a similar view, perhaps a little more emphatically, in which she stuck
closely to precedent in defending race-consciousness in higher education
admissions.210
More expansively, in Parents Involved, Justice Breyer set forth a 74-page
dissent—joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg—that took direct aim at Roberts’s
opinion for the Court.211 Unsurprisingly, Breyer reached a different conclusion in
upholding the student assignment plans at issue there. But in keeping with the
preceding Part, what Breyer offered was something quite a bit less than an
alternative constitutional vision. Sticking closely to the Democratic Party’s
orientation to cautious legal pragmatism, what he offered instead was a mix of
technical doctrinal argument and policy-driven pragmatism. To be sure, one might
say that these are perhaps characteristics peculiar to Breyer and his jurisprudential
approach. But one might just as easily say that the elevation of someone like Breyer
to the Court, with such a jurisprudential approach, says something about
contemporary party and judicial dynamics as well.
Central to Breyer’s opinion was a reliance on precedent. In particular, he
focused on the Court’s rulings on desegregation soon after Brown v. Board of
Education that were the high chief water-mark of federal judicial intervention on
school desegregation. Breyer quoted Chief Justice Burger at length in the latter’s
opinion for the Court in Swann, in support of the use of race-conscious governmental
actions:
A longstanding and unbroken line of legal authority tells us that the Equal
Protection Clause permits local school boards to use race-conscious
criteria to achieve positive race-related goals, even when the Constitution
does not compel it. Because of its importance, I shall repeat what this
Court said about the matter in Swann. Chief Justice Burger, on behalf of a
unanimous Court in a case of exceptional importance, wrote:
206
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School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to
formulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for
example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society
each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students
reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an
educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school
authorities.212
These precedents provided support for Breyer’s earlier comments in his opinion
rejecting the doctrinal distinction between de jure and de facto segregation that
Roberts had relied on, in part, to rule against the school districts involved in the
present case.213 To be sure, Breyer did, at moments, provide a more expansive
statement on race consciousness that stuck closely to Democratic Party orthodoxy,
in again invoking Swann:
That Swann’s legal statement should find such broad acceptance is not
surprising. For Swann is predicated upon a well-established legal view of
the Fourteenth Amendment. That view understands the basic objective of
those who wrote the Equal Protection Clause as forbidding practices that
lead to racial exclusion. The Amendment sought to bring into American
society as full members those whom the Nation had previously held in
slavery.214
Yet, also in line with Democratic Party orthodoxy, this statement was based upon
and emanated from arguments rooted in the Court’s prior doctrine.215 And Breyer’s
conclusion here ultimately led to the relatively modest conclusion of a more relaxed
doctrinal test that might generally be applied to benign race-conscious governmental
actions.216
Finally, underscoring the modesty of the judicial approach offered by Breyer,
his acceptance of judicial partiality in his Parents Involved dissent was framed in
part as both an element of judicial impartiality, and as a requisite part of judicial
modesty and deference to local governmental authority:
The plurality, or at least those who follow Justice Thomas’ “‘color-blind’”
approach may feel confident that, to end invidious discrimination, one
must end all governmental use of race-conscious criteria including those
with inclusive objectives. By way of contrast, I do not claim to know how
212
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best to stop harmful discrimination; how best to create a society that
includes all Americans; how best to overcome our serious problems of
increasing de facto segregation, troubled inner city schooling, and poverty
correlated with race. But, as a judge, I do know that the Constitution does
not authorize judges to dictate solutions to these problems. Rather, the
Constitution creates a democratic political system through which the
people themselves must together find answers. And it is for them to debate
how best to educate the Nation’s children and how best to administer
America’s schools to achieve that aim. The Court should leave them to
their work. And it is for them to decide, to quote the plurality’s slogan,
whether the best “way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race.”217
This was not an emphatic defense of judicial partiality as part of the judicial role
then. Evident in Breyer’s opinion was judicial acceptance of governmental raceconscious, though justified by supportive precedents from earlier, more liberal
Courts, and aligned with a contemporary Democratic orientation to judicial modesty.
A similar orientation was also present in Breyer’s concurring opinion in
Schuette, where he found the political-process precedents to be inapplicable in that
case,218 and ultimately emphasized the importance of deference to democratic
decision-making bodies in voting to uphold the Michigan state constitutional
amendment:
Finally, the principle that underlies Hunter and Seattle runs up against a
competing principle, discussed above. This competing principle favors
decisionmaking though [sic] the democratic process. Just as this principle
strongly supports the right of the people, or their elected representatives,
to adopt race-conscious policies for reasons of inclusion, so must it give
them the right to vote not to do so.219
One significant exception to this trend of Democratic judicial modesty and
cautiousness on partiality themes is worthy of extended comment here: Sotomayor’s
dissent in Schuette.220 There, she offered an expansive dissent from the Court’s
ruling upholding the Michigan state constitutional amendment. In part, her dissent
touched on more technical and narrow doctrine-based arguments,221 Michiganspecific arguments,222 and policy-based arguments on diversity.223 But beyond these
217
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points, she also offered extensive references to the history of racial discrimination,224
arguments in favor of departing from recent conservative precedents,225 and a more
foundational argument in defense of partiality in the law and in the judicial role.226
As Sotomayor stated in direct response to Roberts’s assertion in Parents Involved:
In my colleagues’ view, examining the racial impact of legislation only
perpetuates racial discrimination. This refusal to accept the stark reality
that race matters is regrettable. The way to stop discrimination on the basis
of race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply
the Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of
racial discrimination. As members of the judiciary tasked with intervening
to carry out the guarantee of equal protection, we ought not sit back and
wish away, rather than confront, the racial inequality that exists in our
society. It is this view that works harm, by perpetuating the facile notion
that what makes race matter is acknowledging the simple truth that race
does matter.227
And yet, as much of a departure as Sotomayor’s opinion may have been from other
recent opinions by left-leaning Supreme Court justices on matters of race and equal
protection, she spoke only for herself and Justice Ginsburg. The likelihood of a
Sotomayor approach capturing a majority of votes on the Supreme Court, especially
with the addition of Justice Kavanaugh, remains quite unlikely for the foreseeable
future.
V. JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY AS ENGAGEMENT
To briefly take stock of the two descriptive claims I have pressed in the
preceding Parts, I first demonstrated, through an examination of the Roberts and
Sotomayor confirmations, the greater Republican affinity for generality and the
greater Democratic affinity for partiality in their respective notions of judicial
impartiality. Their respective orientations were rooted in each party’s coalitional
structure and in their ideological histories. Second, I argued that these competing
conceptions of judicial impartiality translate inexactly to the arena of adjudication.
In the context of key Roberts Court rulings on race and equal protection, the
Democratic affinity for partiality emerges as one element within a broader
inclination among Democratic-appointed justices toward a cautious, progressive
pragmatism. Likewise, among the Republican-appointed justices, their commitment
to generality is modified by concessions to doctrinal technicalities and principles,
carried over from prior Courts, that are supportive of some forms of partiality.
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Thus, even if Supreme Court confirmation hearings and debates may provide
relatively simple, clear-cut normative guides on what judicial impartiality demands,
the picture gets muddled once one examines judicial rulings. And if one takes an
even broader view that incorporates the centrality of Donald Trump in the modern
Republican Party, the picture becomes even more muddled: in Trump, we see the
leader of the Republican Party referencing not a principled belief in generality, but
a belief in the inevitability of pure, even grotesque, partisanship driving judicial
behavior.228 True to his comments during his confirmation, it fell to Chief Justice
Roberts to articulate traditional Republican Party orthodoxy in response to Trump,
claiming “We do not have Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton
judges.”229
In this Part, I will aim to put forth my third and final claim: that some normative
guidance in conceptualizing judicial impartiality can be gleaned from these prior
discussions. That is, notwithstanding enduring partisan differences on the topic, and
the context of heightened polarization in our political life more broadly, there are
small areas of commonality that might be uncovered and developed that could reach
across at least some of the consequential present-day partisan divides.
Let us start from some of the observations noted earlier in Part II about areas of
potential convergence between Democratic and Republican senators in the
confirmation hearings and debates. First, at least as a matter of general perception,
there seems to be agreement that a degree of partiality in the judicial role seems
inevitable; it seems inescapable for most that as a structural matter, social facts about
litigants will have some effect—perhaps greater in some instances and less in
others—in how those litigants are treated by judicial actors. This may be due to a
judge’s affinity with or sympathy toward certain social groups driven by common
background, commonality on some other element of social status, or common
deeply-held ideologies. Affinity may also be due to the repeated convergence
between a judge and a particular social group on key legal and policy outcomes. As
noted in Part II, Democratic senators have been more candid in acknowledging this
point, though Republican senators have also acknowledged and endorsed the
possibility of judicial partiality toward those social groups whose interests are (they
believe) firmly grounded in legitimate constitutional principle. At the same time,
however, there is certainly something normatively appealing and powerful about the
aspiration toward generality and universalism, or more precisely, the hope that legal
outcomes may be rooted in something more compelling than mere judicial whim or
unprincipled favoritism.
I refer then to a point raised before in Part II: that at root, what Democratic and
Republican senators seem to be inching toward in their competing notions of judicial
impartiality is that a litigant might receive a fair chance, or fair treatment, in front of
an impartial judge, no matter who that litigant might be. A tentative and normatively228
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attractive conception of judicial impartiality thus emerges: accepting that some
degree of partiality is inevitable in the judicial role—and that judges cannot be
wholly blind to certain social facts about litigants appearing before them—I would
assert that judicial impartiality denotes a consistent, good-faith engagement with the
claims and interests of those who lie outside the social groups that are aligned with
a judicial actor. Impartiality demands, in other words, openness on the part of a
judicial actor to consider experiences, opinions, and values that may lie beyond their
own inclinations.
Judicial impartiality-as-engagement remains, admittedly, quite vague and
abstract and it provides no ready analytical tools for easily determining if judicial
impartiality was displayed by a given judicial actor in a given case. Consistent, goodfaith engagement is a procedural element, whose presence or absence we might
ascertain with varying degrees of confidence only after extended observation of a
judicial actor, and close examination of their treatment of multiple cases. Even after
this, and even if opinions may converge among observers on some points, opinions
might still diverge on the ultimate determination of whether the judicial actor was
impartial or not.
This is all to suggest that in the contemporary context, a realistic and
normatively-attractive conception of judicial impartiality may amount to something
more like an attitude or a spirit rather than a coherent set of discrete principles, or a
commitment to any set of outcomes. Indeed, the definition I am providing suggests
that two judges reaching the same legal outcome may not necessarily share the same
orientation toward judicial impartiality: one judge might conceivably reach an
outcome by engaging in an impartial manner, as I have defined it, while another
judge might conceivably reach the same outcome by ruling in a wholly indifferent
or impulsive or biased manner.
Yet, as vague as this definition might be at the micro-level, I believe it also
provides more analytical value from a broader vantage point—especially if applied
to something as broad as general orientations toward judicial impartiality from
Democrats and Republicans. Applied to this question, judicial impartiality-asengagement does provide some lessons for Democrats and Republicans interested
in furthering this ideal, and in offering a coherent vision of their party’s judicial and
legal philosophy.
For Democrats, their spirit of caution in recent years superficially aligns with
the notion of judicial impartiality offered here. However, one might argue that this
caution and tentativeness has nevertheless failed to benefit Democrats in being
viewed as staunch upholders of judicial impartiality beyond their core constituencies
because, arguably, their caution has been misplaced: even if Democratic Party
jurisprudential principles have been applied in a qualified way, the Party and its
judicial appointees are still too closely identified with their core constituencies and
key policy commitments to give them much credibility beyond their usual allies.
However, there might be a different way forward for Democrats to reach across the
aisle, and bolster their claims to judicial impartiality, by utilizing a different mix of
principle and caution.
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If impartiality-as-engagement presses judicial actors to look to interests and
claims beyond those of their usual allies, the Democratic affinity toward partiality
should arguably be more, rather than less, expansive and full-throated. That is,
Democrats and Democratic-appointed judicial actors might consider the possibility
of embracing partiality themes more empathically—as consistent with their core
principles and as consistent with how the Party is more broadly viewed. However,
with a more emphatic endorsement of partiality, Democratic-appointed judicial
actors might then proceed to apply it to a broader range of social groups—beyond
the Party’s usual allies—who might plausibly press forth their own claims of
systemic or structural disadvantage. In this way, the Party and its judicial appointees
might undertake a broader engagement beyond its usual constituents and
demonstrate willingness to engage more broadly with the perspectives of others.
The one example that seems prominent, in this regard, are those disadvantaged
by economic class. Accordingly, the modern-day Democratic party has retained a
degree of uncertainty on how much it might incorporate class grievances within its
party ideology in the preceding few decades.230 And even if more of this rhetoric has
seeped into the Party since the 2016 presidential election, certainly no coherent
liberal judicial philosophy focused on economic disadvantage seems guaranteed to
be central to the Party’s ideology either.231 Again, to further the ideal of judicial
impartiality as described here, Democratic political actors and judicial appointees
could bring such ideas back to central prominence.
For Republicans, their legal emphasis on generality and universalism certainly
has its moments as appealing rhetoric for some in the Party, as does the Trumpinspired emphasis on rural, white, conservative grievance for others. 232 Perhaps
ironically, however, what is common to both of these facets of modern-day
Republican Party ideology is a kind of rigidity and dogmatism that conflicts with
the notion of judicial impartiality offered here. Thus, in order for Republican judicial
actors—who have been shaped by such ideals—to move closer to a norm of judicial
impartiality-as-engagement, the key question would be their willingness to openly
endorse and affirm a spirit of tentativeness and cautiousness on legal questions. To
be dogmatic is to foreclose genuine engagement, so for Republican judicial actors
to move toward the latter, adopting some of the Democratic spirit of cautious
pragmatism would be ideal. This would entail more than simply toning down some
of the rigid insistence on, for example, originalism, or the significance of gun rights,
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or the significance of property rights. More than this, it would entail Republican
judicial actors affirming a cautious, pragmatic approach as normatively-defensible
in its own right. If such a hypothetical seems hard to imagine in the present moment,
we might remember that the values of moderate Republicanism in the early to middle
decades of the twentieth century would have aligned quite well such an approach.
As Kabaservice notes of this philosophy:
Because [moderate Republicans] believed in disinterested consideration of
the issues, they were able to work with Democrats to solve problems, and
to maintain a level of balance and civility in politics that has long since
vanished. But because they were not beholden to the Democrats’ coalition
of special-interest constituencies, they could take a broader and longerterm viewpoint and uphold values such as civil liberties and meritocracy
that commanded only weak support from both Democrats and
conservative Republicans.233
It is a testament to how transformed the Republican Party has become that there is
no obvious or emphatic standard-bearer for these values among high-profile
Republicans at present.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have put forth two descriptive claims: one concerning divergent
conceptions of judicial impartiality between Democratic and Republican senators in
the context of Supreme Court confirmation hearings and debates, and one
concerning competing conceptions of judicial impartiality by Supreme Court
justices in the context of key race and equal protection rulings by the Roberts Court.
In the preceding Part, I have also put forth a third claim more normative in nature:
that judicial impartiality might best be understood, in the present time, as consistent,
good-faith engagement by judicial actors with the claims and interests of individuals
or groups who are not obviously aligned with those judicial actors, either by
ideology or by other significant elements of social status.
Underlying this normative claim, and its recommendation that contemporary
judicial actors approach their work and their rulings with such a spirit of openmindedness, is my background belief that the forms and processes that constitute
much of the activity of law matter. That is, there is a significance that attaches to
how judges do their work, reach their conclusions, and conduct themselves that
exists independently of the specific outcomes and policy conclusions they will reach.
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It seems that especially in a time of intense political polarization and disagreement
over substantive legal and policy issues, the cultivation of basic norms such as
judicial impartiality-as-engagement by judicial and non-judicial actors will be all the
more crucial for the health of the American polity.

